Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

A note on approximate Nash equilibria

By Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta and Christos Papadimitriou

Abstract

In view of the intractability of finding a Nash equilibrium, it is important to understand the limits of approximation in this context. A subexponential approximation scheme is known [LMM03], and no approximation better than 1 is possible by any algorithm that examines 4 equilibria involving fewer than log n strategies [Alt94]. We give a simple, linear-time algorithm examining just two strategies per player and resulting in a 1-approximate Nash equilibrium in any 2-player game. For the 2 more demanding notion of well-supported approximate equilibrium due to [DGP06] no nontrivial bound is known; we show that the problem can be reduced to the case of win-lose games (games with all utilities 0 − 1), and that an approximation of 5 is possible contingent upon a 6 graph-theoretic conjecture

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.135.5470
Provided by: CiteSeerX
Download PDF:
Sorry, we are unable to provide the full text but you may find it at the following location(s):
  • http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/v... (external link)
  • http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~co... (external link)
  • Suggested articles


    To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.