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An Examination of the Efficiency of Resource Allocation Auctions Within Firms

By Stanley Baiman, Paul Fischer, Madhav V. Rajan and Richard Saouma

Abstract

Markets have a remarkable capacity for producing efficient resource allocations when information about relative values is dispersed across economic agents. We explore the use of market mechanisms inside the firm to address a resource allocation problem, and compare the outcome with the first- and second-best solution. Although the market mechanism does not always attain the first-best or even second-best benchmark, it is significantly simpler to implement. Moreover, we identify circumstances under which the losses involved in using a market rather than the optimal second-best contract are negligible

Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.135.2593
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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