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Timing attacks in low-latency mix systems (Extended Abstract)

By Brian N. Levine, Michael K. Reiter, Chenxi Wang and Matthew Wright

Abstract

A mix is a communication proxy that attempts to hide the correspondence between its incoming and outgoing messages. Timing attacks are a significant challenge for mix-based systems that wish to support interactive, low-latency applications. However, the potency of these attacks has not been studied carefully. In this paper, we investigate timing analysis attacks on low-latency mix systems and clarify the threat they pose. We propose a novel technique, defensive dropping, to thwart timing attacks. Through simulations and analysis, we show that defensive dropping can be effective against attackers who employ timing analysis

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2004
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.135.1374
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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