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Deception In Non-cooperative Games with Partial Information

By João P. Hespanha, Yusuf S. Ateskan and Hüseyin H. Kizilocak

Abstract

In this report we illustrate how deception can be used by rational players in the context of noncooperative stochastic games with partial information. We show that, when one of the players can manipulate the information available to its opponents, deception can be used to increase the player's payoff by effectively rendering the information available to its opponent useless. However, this is not always the case. Paradoxically, when the degree of possible manipulation is high, deception becomes useless against an intelligent opponent since it will simply ignore the information that has potentially been manipulated. This study is carried out for a prototype problem that arises in the control of military operations, but the ideas presented are useful in other areas of applications, such as price negotiation, multi-object auctioning, pursuit-evasion, etc

Year: 2001
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.135.1274
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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