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Opponent Models and Heuristic Strategies for Simple Games

By Timothy J. Vickery

Abstract

This study introduces a model that describes the reasoning strategies of a population of players in simultaneous-move, one-shot games. In the past, models of such behavior have explicitly employed the concept of Nash equilibrium in players’ models of other players. In this model, behavior is accounted for in terms of simple heuristic strategies and opponent modeling, rather than by recourse to the concept of Nash equilibrium. The model represents six types of boundedly rational players: three types who employ no model of their opponents, two types who model their opponents as employing simple heuristics, and one type who models the population as a mixture of different types of players. Results show promise for eliminating the concept of Nash equilibrium from players’ models of other players. In pursuit of this goal, a new type of graphical model based on Influence Diagrams is developed. Uncertain Decision Diagrams are suitable for modeling human decision-making with respect to explicit mental models that include noisy estimates of utility, and can be extended to model players’ models of other players

Year: 2005
OAI identifier: oai:CiteSeerX.psu:10.1.1.134.8659
Provided by: CiteSeerX
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