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Dispute deterrence: evidence on final-offer arbitration

By S. Milner

Abstract

Final-offer arbitration is specifically designed to deter disputes more efficiently than conventional arbitration. Over the last decade a number of UK workplaces have signed new collective agreements incorporating this form of arbitration. Evidence from 72 of these plants, covering nearly 300 bargaining rounds, is used to test the theory. The data suggest that, except in multistage dispute procedures, FAO is not more effective than conventional arbitration at preventing disputes in collective bargaining

Topics: HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Publisher: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 1992
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:21053
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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