The question of the function of modal judgement is an interesting philosophical issue, and John Divers's paper (this volume) has persuaded me that it has not received the attention it deserves. I think it is an important and interesting question even apart from any more ambitious claims that are made about its role in settling other issues about modality. Even if we became convinced that the story about function put no constraints whatsoever, epistemologically or metaphysically, on a theory of modality, it would still remain an interesting question about one of the pervasive and perhaps fundamental things we do in our cognitive lives. Divers’s paper is primarily concerned with establishing the legitimacy and importance of the question of the function of modal judgement, and disposing of some “quick answers” that might incline you to think there was not much of importance to be found here. There is too much that is thought-provoking to try to cover everything, so in these comments I want to talk about three things. The first two are challenges to Divers ’ project. Should sorting out the function of modal judgement be a job for philosophers in the first place? When we think about the question of function in other areas of theory, don’t we realis
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