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An equilibrium search-matching model of discrimination

By A. Rosen

Abstract

A model in which firms have incomplete information about workers at the hiring stage is shown to entail discrimination as the unique stable equilibrium outcome, even if no agents have a taste for discrimination. Discriminated groups (e.g., blacks, women) earn lower wages, endure longer unemployment spells, and must satisfy stricter requirements in order to obtain work

Topics: HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Publisher: Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science
Year: 1992
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:21024
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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