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How regime theory and the economic theory of international environmental cooperation can learn from each other

By Eric Neumayer
Topics: H Social Sciences (General)
Publisher: The MIT Press
Year: 2001
DOI identifier: 10.1162/152638001570660
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:18899
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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