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Robin Hood's compromise: land reforms, inequality, redistribution and moral hazard

By Oriana Bandiera and Gilat Levy

Abstract

This Paper analyses an unusually conservative type of redistribution. We take land from the very rich, as usual, but give it to the rich instead of the poor. We show that this type of reform reduces agency costs, thus increasing productivity, total surplus in the economy, and workers’ welfare. Compared to the classic redistribution ‘to the tiller’ it does worse in terms of equity and does not give the poor a collaterizable asset but it is likely to be more sustainable, both economically and politically

Topics: HN Social history and conditions. Social problems. Social reform, HD Industries. Land use. Labor
Publisher: Centre for Economic Policy Research
Year: 2004
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:5376
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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