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Endogenous lobbying

By Leonardo Felli and Antonio Merlo

Abstract

In this paper, we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying biases the outcome of the political process toward the centre of the policy space, and extreme policies cannot emerge in equilibrium. Moreover, in equilibrium, not all lobbies participate in the policy-making process

Topics: JA Political science (General), HB Economic Theory
Publisher: Centre for Economic Policy Research
Year: 2002
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:5351
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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