The Paradox between the European Pillar of Social Rights and EU Economic Governance: Spanish Reforms to Wage-Setting Institutions and the Working Poor

Abstract

The European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) was announced as a new platform for advancing social policy in the European Union. Among the principles and rights enshrined in the EPSR, the Commission has included the right of workers to be paid fair wages. However, in the context of EU Economic Governance, the EU country-specific recommendations steer national wage-setting institutions in the opposite direction. The outcomes sought by EU Economic Governance and the EPSR thus produce a paradox. This paper presents the Spanish case as an example of this paradox. More specifically, it assesses the reforms the Spanish Government made to minimum wage rules and the collective bargaining system during the financial crisis. In the end, all those reforms have led to wage stagnation and devaluation, causing an increasing number of working poor. El Pilar Europeo de Derechos Sociales (EPSR) fue presentado como una nueva etapa en la dimensi&oacute;n social de la Uni&oacute;n Europea. Entre los principios y derechos consagrados en la EPSR, la Comisi&oacute;n incluy&oacute; el derecho de los trabajadores a un salario justo. Sin embargo, en el contexto de la gobernanza econ&oacute;mica de la UE, las Recomendaciones a los pa&iacute;ses de la UE llevan a las instituciones nacionales de fijaci&oacute;n de salarios en la direcci&oacute;n contraria. Por lo tanto, los resultados buscados por la nueva gobernanza de la Uni&oacute;n Europea y el EPSR producen una paradoja. Este art&iacute;culo toma el caso espa&ntilde;ol como ejemplo de dicha paradoja. M&aacute;s concretamente, eval&uacute;a las reformas adoptadas por el Gobierno espa&ntilde;ol durante la crisis con respecto al salario m&iacute;nimo y al sistema de negociaci&oacute;n colectiva, las cuales han llevado a una moderaci&oacute;n o una devaluaci&oacute;n de los salarios, favoreciendo el aumento de la pobreza laboral. DOWNLOAD THIS PAPER FROM SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3209435</a