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On the theory of ethnic conflict

By Francesco Caselli and Wilbur John Coleman II

Abstract

We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy's resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources

Topics: HC Economic History and Conditions, JA Political science (General), GN Anthropology
Publisher: Centre for Economic Policy Research
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:5263
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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