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Understanding rules and institutions: possibilities and limits of game theory

By David M. Woodruff

Abstract

Examines whether the modelling of institutions as equilibrium strategies in a repeated game is effective, arguing that it can be, but only in those circumstances in which local context is unimportant. Discusses the analytic dangers that arise when susceptibility of institutions to compact game-theoretic modelling is assumed when incentives are in fact contextual

Topics: JA Political science (General)
Publisher: American Political Science Association, Qualitative and Multi-Methods Research Section
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:4111
Provided by: LSE Research Online
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