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Competition and incentives with motivated agents

By Tim Besley and Maitreesh Ghatak
Topics: HB Economic Theory
Year: 2005
DOI identifier: 10.1257/0002828054201413
OAI identifier: oai:eprints.lse.ac.uk:928
Provided by: LSE Research Online

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