Full text of this paper is not currently available on the LRA. The original paper was presented out in 2009 at the INMM Annual Meeting.Establishing the new nuclear taboo: Pakistan’s nuclear behaviour after the revelation\ud of A. Q. Khan Case\ud Author: Rizwana Abbasi\ud This paper is available on purchase at www.inmm.org\ud Abstract\ud Because of the obloquy it suffered in 2003-4 at the time of the revelation of Khan’s\ud proliferation activities, Pakistan has accepted in effect that there is now a second nuclear\ud taboo – against nuclear proliferation – and has implemented measures to achieve this. As a\ud responsible state, Pakistan stepped forward and fully cooperated with the global community\ud and addressed this threat both at home and abroad. The US at the global level sought to\ud address some of the existing loopholes within the non-proliferation regime and to establish\ud close ties with Pakistan to prevent a recurrence of such breaches. Pakistan reinforced its\ud existing organizational structure, addressed loopholes in its export controls – aligning it with\ud the global non-proliferation system – and strengthened the arrangements to monitor nuclear\ud personnel at the domestic level. There were three main areas for improvement: the integrity\ud of the command and control structure; preventing proliferation insiders and ensuring the\ud physical security of nuclear weapons. Within this debate, the study addresses Pakistan’s\ud nuclear behaviour which seeks to establish a new nuclear taboo
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