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Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium

By Ludovic Renou and Karl H. Schlag


This Note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of ε-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in ε-minimax regret equilibrium for all ε∈[0,1)

Topics: implementation, minimax regret, Maskin monotonicity
Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2010
DOI identifier: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.010
OAI identifier:

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