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Economic aspects of the Microsoft case: networks, interoperability and competition

By Maria José Gil-Moltó

Abstract

In this paper, we discuss the main economic aspects of the European Microsoft case; in particular, Microsoft’s refusal to supply the necessary information to make the competitors’ work group server systems interoperable with Windows Operating System. The case can be seen as an example of competition between networks. We review the relevant economics literature with the objective of understanding the motivations behind Microsoft’s strategies

Topics: Networks, Complementarities, Foreclosure, Interoperability, Antitrust
Publisher: Dept. of Economics, University of Leicester
Year: 2008
OAI identifier: oai:lra.le.ac.uk:2381/7581

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Citations

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