Argues in favour of collapsing the defences of duress by threats and circumstances, necessity, and self defence into one general defence of necessity, termed necessary action. Explores whether this could help to resolve the anomalies which exist due to the difficulties of existing classifications, including in particular the arguments over the extent to which necessity can be raised as a defence and its relationship with duress of circumstances. Examines the validity and value of the argument for distinguishing between justification and excuse as a means of separating the defences before considering the common underlying rationale for a broader defence of necessary action in the light of the principle of whether the response was a reasonable and proportionate response to the specific danger. Includes consideration of the objection to a broad defence that it would go against the principle of fair labelling.Peer-reviewedPublisher Versio
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