Le modèle des « insiders-outsiders » : entre théorie et pratiques

Abstract

The paper first attempts to present the insider-outsider theory. The Belgian system of wage bargaining is highlighted in the second section. The third section compiles some empirical studies on this issue. The findings do not allow us to conclude that the insider-outsider theory works. Some countries with decentralized systems of bargaining, especially the U.S., achieve results close to ¿corporatiste?countries. Wage in countries with centralized bargaining are more responsive to unemployment than in some countries where wage bargaining is decentralized. The ¿corporatiste?countries do not seem to systematically get poorer economic results. The Calmfors and Driffill model with a U shaped relation between employment and bargaining level does not have much empirical support according to an OECD study. The main significant result is the clear relationship between centralization of bargaining and reduction of wage inequality. The outsiders also share this last objective.Insiders-outsiders, wages, unemployment, collective bargaining