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Rationality Assumptions of Game Theory

By Andrew M. Colman


An analysis of backward induction reasoning in games using nonmonotonic reasoningEconomic and Social Research Counci

Topics: backward induction, Chain-store game, Centipede game, nonmonotonic reasoning, circumscription
Publisher: Oxford: Oxford University Press
Year: 1998
OAI identifier: oai:lra.le.ac.uk:2381/3981

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