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Love is not enough: Other-regarding preferences cannot explain payoff dominance in game theory

By Andrew M. Colman


This is the author's draft of an article published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences if game theory is broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, it cannot adequately model all aspects of interactive decision making. Payoff dominance is an example of a phenomenon that can be adequately modeled only by departing radically from standard assumptions of decision theory and game theory – either the unit of agency or the nature of rationality

Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2007
OAI identifier:

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