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Love is not enough: Other-regarding preferences cannot explain payoff dominance in game theory

By Andrew M. Colman


This is the author's draft of an article published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=BBSEven if game theory is broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, it cannot adequately model all aspects of interactive decision making. Payoff dominance is an example of a phenomenon that can be adequately modeled only by departing radically from standard assumptions of decision theory and game theory – either the unit of agency or the nature of rationality

Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Year: 2007
OAI identifier: oai:lra.le.ac.uk:2381/525

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