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Effects of rotation scheme on fishing behaviour with price discrimination and limited durability: Theory and evidence.

By Erika Seki

Abstract

This paper examines how rotation arrangement between two groups of fishers with different institutional arrangements affects fishing behaviour and economic outcomes in a particular economic environment characterised by price discrimination and product durability. In one group, fishers cooperate and maximise the extraction of rents, while members in the second group behave non-cooperatively. Applying a model of alternating duopoly, we show that the cooperating group behaves like a price discriminating monopolist and tends to uphold prices. When the two groups rotate fishing days the cooperating group tends to produce more, which prevents the non-cooperating group from unprofitable demand pre-emption

Topics: price discrimination, fisheries, alternating duopoly, durable goods
Publisher: University of Aberdeen Business School
Year: 2004
OAI identifier: oai:aura.abdn.ac.uk:2164/9

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