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Games Without Rules

By Flavio Menezes and John Quiggin

Abstract

We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium

Topics: games, rules, Nash equilibrium, economics, oligopoly, Economics, Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods, outcome spaces, folk theorem, Rent-seeking, 340205 Industry Economics and Industrial Organisation
Year: 2004
OAI identifier: oai:espace.library.uq.edu.au:UQ:10129

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