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Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks

By Paul Joskow

Abstract

Modern theoretical principles to govern the design of incentive regulation mechanisms are reviewed and discussed. General issues associated with applying these principles in practice are identified. Examples of the actual application of incentive regulation mechanisms to the regulation of prices and service quality for “unbundled” transmission and distribution networks are presented and discussed. Evidence regarding the performance of incentive regulation in practice for electric distribution and transmission networks is reviewed. Issues for future research are identified

Topics: Classification-JEL: L94, L51, regulation, incentives, networks, electricity, transmission, distribution
Publisher: Faculty of Economics
Year: 2006
OAI identifier: oai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/131651
Provided by: Apollo

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