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On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly

By Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni


Most of the voting models restrict themselves to the analysis of symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which ‘similar’ voters make ‘similar’ voting decisions. In this paper we investigate this assumption under costly pluralityvoting. In any pure strategy equilibrium, if two active voters have the same preference order over candidates, they do vote for the same candidate. However, as an example shows, this type of result cannot be hoped for mixed strategies equilibria

Topics: Classification-JEL: C72, D72., Strategic Voting, Symmetric Equilibria
Publisher: Faculty of Economics
Year: 2006
OAI identifier:
Provided by: Apollo

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