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oaioai:www.repository.cam.ac.uk:1810/131604

Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case

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Publication date
14 March 2006
Publisher
Faculty of Economics
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    Abstract

    We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which thepolicy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptionson voters'preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties

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    Apollo (Cambridge)

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    This paper was published in Apollo (Cambridge).

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