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La partialité par les projets

By Sarah Stroud

Abstract

This paper investigates how we can most effectively argue that partiality toward certain people and not others is morally permissible. Philosophers who strongly insist that morality must leave room for partiality have not made explicit their basis for this conclusion; the present paper comparatively assesses a variety of possible argument strategies which could be deployed in this regard. One promising strategy exploits the acknowledged force of the argument from “the personal point of view,” here interpreted as referring specifically to an agent’s projects. If moral demands must be tempered in light of the special significance to an agent of his own projects, then perhaps the agent’s partial attachments to other people should also receive a measure of protection from impartial moral claims. The case is bolstered by noting the ubiquity of plural or collective agency in contexts of close personal relations: often the two (or more) agents in such relationships together pursue joint projects and even constitute a plural agent. This approach does justify special moral treatment of one’s co-agents, although it does not match our initial conception of partiality in all respects

Topics: ethics, fundamental ethics, partiality, projects, Ethics, BJ1-1725, Philosophy. Psychology. Religion, B, DOAJ:Philosophy, DOAJ:Philosophy and Religion
Publisher: Université de Montréal
Year: 2008
OAI identifier: oai:doaj.org/article:32e19de0b3e540bb8b1d76afa92e1522
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