Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions
Abstract
Forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics. We study the consequences of leniency – reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers – on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that - when not properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence- doc-type:workingPaper
- Paper
- NonPeerReviewed
- Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems
- C2 - Intellektuelles Eigentum, Aneignung von Innovationserträgen und Innovationswettbewerb
- C6 - Kommunikations- und Transporttechnologien, Industrie- und Regionalstruktur
- ddc:330