Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Leniency Policies and Illegal Transactions

By Paolo Buccirossi and Giancarlo Spagnolo

Abstract

Forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics. We study the consequences of leniency – reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers – on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that - when not properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence.

Topics: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, C2 - Intellektuelles Eigentum, Aneignung von Innovationserträgen und Innovationswettbewerb, C6 - Kommunikations- und Transporttechnologien, Industrie- und Regionalstruktur, ddc:330
Year: 2005
DOI identifier: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.008
OAI identifier: oai:epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de:13477
Provided by: Open Access LMU

Suggested articles


To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.