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On the existence of strategic solutions for games with security- and potential level players

By Alexander Zimper

Abstract

This paper examines the existence of strategic solutions for finite normal form games under the assumption that strategy choices can be described as choices among lotteries where players have security- and potential level preferences over lotteries (e.g., Gilboa, 1988; Jaffray, 1988; Cohen, 1992). Since security- and potential level preferences require discontinuous utility representations, standard existence results for Nash equilibria in mixed strategies (Nash, 1950a,b) or for equilibria in beliefs (Crawford, 1990) do not apply. As a key insight this paper proves that non-existence of equilibria in beliefs, and therefore non-existence of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, is possible in finite games with security- and potential level players. But, as this paper also shows, rationalizable strategies (Bernheim, 1984; Moulin, 1984; Pearce, 1984) exist for such games. Rationalizability rather than equilibrium in beliefs therefore appears to be a more favorable solution concept for games with security- and potential level players

Topics: 330 Wirtschaft
Year: 2004
OAI identifier: oai:ub-madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de:2740

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