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Letting the briber go free: an experiment on mitigating harassment bribes

By Klaus Abbink, Utteeyo Dasgupta, Lata Gangadharan and Tarun Jain


This paper examines the effectiveness of using asymmetric liability to combat harassment bribes. Basu (2011) advocates legal immunity for bribe-givers, while retaining culpability for bribe-takers. Results from our experiment indicate that while this policy has the potential to significantly reduce corrupt practices, weak economic incentives for the bribe-giver, or retaliation by bribe-takers can mitigate the positive disciplining effect of such an implementation. As a result, asymmetric liability on its own may face challenges in the field.

Topics: K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law, C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Year: 2012
DOI identifier: 10.2139/ssrn.2166221
OAI identifier: oai:mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de:42176

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