Cena węgla brunatnego jako wyznacznik podziału zysku w układach kopalń i elektrowni. Część I – Propozycje podziału
Abstract
Different structures of lignite mines and power stations, which have appeared on the Polish market as a result of its transformation and the privatisation, were discussed. The attention is focused on the fact that the practice is overtaking the theory because there is lack of models of functioning of such structures. A model of cooperation between the mine and the power station was worked out for the established amount of coal what can describe the situation of particular ultimate pit choice (in long run) or realization of supplies of the constant amount of lignite in frames of the long-term contract (in short run e.g. one of year). It is proposed to treat a negotiation of the lignite price as a constant sum game and a lignite price as the determinant of the total profit division. The choice of lignite price between prices outlining break-even points of the mine and the power station determines the distribution of the profit to both sides. It is similar to the contract curve in the classical bilateral monopoly model. Ten different methods of the profit division are proposed. Argumentation speaking for proposed solutions was presented favouring the pro-posal of equal profit margins calculated without the costs of fuel purchase- MPRA Paper
- NonPeerReviewed
- R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
- L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L72 - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Other Nonrenewable Resources
- Q31 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
- L14 - Transactional Relationships ; Contracts and Reputation ; Networks
- D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- Q41 - Demand and Supply ; Prices
- D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
- C72 - Noncooperative Games
- L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L10 - General
- C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory
- L42 - Vertical Restraints ; Resale Price Maintenance ; Quantity Discounts
- L0 - General
- D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
- L94 - Electric Utilities
- C71 - Cooperative Games
- C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development