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An algorithm for a super-stable roommates problem

By T. Fleiner, R.W. Irving and D.F. Manlove


In this paper, we describe an efficient algorithm that decides if a stable matching exists for a generalized stable roommates problem, where, instead of linear preferences, agents have partial preference orders on potential partners. Furthermore, we may forbid certain partnerships, that is, we are looking for a matching such that none of the matched pairs is forbidden, and yet, no blocking pair (forbidden or not) exists.\ud \ud To solve the above problem, we generalize the first algorithm for the ordinary stable roommates problem

Topics: QA
Publisher: Elsevier
Year: 2011
OAI identifier:
Provided by: Enlighten

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