The claim I\u27ve made is that there is an often overlooked ontological realism that is properly associated with the Deweyan pragmatic inquiry, the implication of which is that \u22what\u22 might be discovered in inquiry, what might be known, is in an important sense set in advance, and is independent of the beliefs, hopes and preferences of the inquirer(s). The \u22production of knowledge,\u22 in virtue of this external limiting determination, is indeed the production of that which is stable, secure, general, and, in one very important sense, \u22transcendent\u22 of the concrete particulars of its originating conditions. This is a rather controversial thesis. In explicating it further here, I shall examine several crucial issues, developing what I take to be the best \u22Deweyan\u22 interpretations, and set these in contrast to the contrary positions on a \u22Deweyan realism\u22 advanced recently by Cunningham and by Garrison
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