Skip to main content
Article thumbnail
Location of Repository

Can catch share fisheries better track management targets?



This is the publisher’s final pdf. The published article is copyrighted by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and can be found at: To the best of our knowledge, one or more authors of this paper were federal employees when contributing to this work.Fisheries management based on catch shares – divisions of annual fleet-wide quotas among individuals or groups – has been strongly supported for their economic benefits, but biological consequences have not been rigorously quantified. We used a global meta-analysis of 345 stocks to assess whether fisheries under catch shares were more likely to track management targets set for sustainable harvest than fisheries managed only by fleet-wide quota caps or effort controls. We examined three ratios: catch-to-quota, current exploitation rate to target exploitation rate and current biomass to target biomass. For each, we calculated the mean response, variation around the target and the frequency of undesirable outcomes with respect to these targets. Regional effects were stronger than any other explanatory variable we examined. After accounting for region, we found the effects of catch shares primarily on catch-to-quota ratios: these ratios were less variable over time than in other fisheries. Over-exploitation occurred in only 9% of stocks under catch shares compared to 13% of stocks under fleet-wide quota caps. Additionally, over-exploitation occurred in 41% of stocks under effort controls, suggesting a substantial benefit of quota caps alone. In contrast, there was no evidence for a response in the biomass of exploited populations because of either fleet-wide quota caps or individual catch shares. Thus, for many fisheries, management controls improve under catch shares in terms of reduced variation in catch around quota targets, but ecological benefits in terms of increased biomass may not be realized by catch shares alone

Topics: Fishery management, individual transferable quota (ITQ), mixed-effects model, output controls, overfishing, propensity score matching
Publisher: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Year: 2012
DOI identifier: 10.1111/j.1467-2979.2011.00429.x
OAI identifier:
Provided by: ScholarsArchive@OSU

Suggested articles


  1. (2006a) Fleet dynamics and fishermen behavior: lessons for fisheries managers. doi
  2. (1986). A critical review of the individual transferable quota as a device in fisheries management. doi
  3. (2002). A fishery manager’s guidebook. Management measures and their application. doi
  4. (1986). Adaptive Management of Renewable Resources. doi
  5. (2005). Autopsy your dead … and living: a proposal for fisheries science, fisheries management and fisheries. doi
  6. (2007). Benchmarking for fisheries governance. doi
  7. (2008). Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? doi
  8. (2006). Catch-quota balancing in multispecies individual fishing quotas. doi
  9. (2001). Changes in fleet capacity following the introduction of individual vessel quotas in the Alaskan Pacific halibut and sablefish fishery. In:
  10. (2007). Comment on ‘‘Impacts of biodiversity loss on ocean ecosystem services’’. doi
  11. (2011). Contrasting global trends in marine fishery status obtained from catches and from stock assessments. Conservation Biology, doi
  12. (2010). Core Team doi
  13. (2011). Current problems in the management of marine fisheries. doi
  14. (2008). Dealing with overdispersed count data in applied ecology. doi
  15. (2009). Diverse fisheries require diverse solutions. doi
  16. (2010). Ecological indicators display reduced variation in North American catch share fisheries. doi
  17. (2004). Ecosystem-based fishery management. doi
  18. (1998). Effects of individual quota systems on New Zealand and British Columbia fisheries. doi
  19. (2011). Extinction, survival or recovery of large predatory fishes. doi
  20. (2009). Fishing for more effective incentives. doi
  21. (2009). Generalized linear mixed models: a practical guide for ecology and evolution. doi
  22. (2010). Global fishery development patterns are driven by profit but not trophic level. doi
  23. (1992). Harvesting regulation under quota management systems for ocean fisheries: decision making in the face of natural variability, weak information, risks and conflicting incentives.
  24. (2009). How do individual transferable quotas affect marine ecosystems? doi
  25. (2006). Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries. doi
  26. (2010). Individual transferable quotas and the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’. doi
  27. (1998). Innovative approaches for fostering conservation in marine fisheries. doi
  28. (2005). Institutions, incentives and the future of fisheries. doi
  29. (2007). Lesser-known consequences of managing marine fisheries using individual transferable quotas. doi
  30. (2009). lme4: Linear MixedEffects Models Using S4 Classes. R package version 0.999375-31 edn. Catch shares to meet management targets?
  31. (2009). Management effectiveness of the world’s marine fisheries. doi
  32. (2007). Managing fisheries is managing people: what has been learned? doi
  33. (2008). Matching catches to quotas in a multispecies trawl fishery: targeting and avoidance behavior under individual transferable quotas. doi
  34. (2002). Model Selection and Multimodel Inference: A Practical Information-Theoretic Approach, 2nd edn. doi
  35. (2004). Performance of precautionary reference points in providing management advice on North Sea fish stocks. doi
  36. (2008). Positioning fisheries in a changing world. doi
  37. (2005). Property rights in fisheries: Iceland’s experience with ITQs. doi
  38. (2010). Ranking the ecological relative status of exploited marine ecosystems. doi
  39. (2008). Reanalyses of Gulf of Mexico fisheries data: landings can be misleading in assessments of fisheries and fisheries ecosystems. doi
  40. (2010). Rebuilding fish stocks no later than 2015: will Europe meet the deadline? doi
  41. (2009). Rebuilding global fisheries. Science 325, 578–585. Supporting Information Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:
  42. (2010). Relating marine ecosystem indicators to fishing and environmental drivers: an elucidation of contrasting responses. doi
  43. (2006). Replacing trip limits with individual transferable quotas: implications for discarding. doi
  44. (1994). Scaling Fisheries: The Science of Measuring the Effects of Fishing, doi
  45. (1954). Some aspects of the dynamics of populations, important for the management of the commercial fisheries. doi
  46. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in observational studies for causal effects. doi
  47. (2004). The conservation and management of shared fish stocks: legal and economic aspects.
  48. (2008). The ecological implications of individual fishing quotas and harvest cooperatives. doi
  49. (2009). The elephant in the room: the hidden costs of leasing individual transferable quotas. doi
  50. (2009). Thirty years later: the global growth of ITQs and their influence on stock status in marine fisheries. doi
  51. (2002). Towards sustainability in world fisheries. doi
  52. (2010). Trends in the abundance of marine fishes. doi
  53. version (09/2010). World Wide Web electronic publication.
  54. version (7/2010). World Wide Web electronic publication.
  55. (1999). What works well and why: evidence from fishery-management experiences in OECD countries. doi

To submit an update or takedown request for this paper, please submit an Update/Correction/Removal Request.