Elections, opportunism, partisanship and sovereign ratings in developing countries

Abstract

We empirically examine whether and how opportunistic and partisan political business cycle (“PBC”) con-siderations explain election-period decisions by credit rating agencies (“agencies”) publishing developing country sovereign risk-ratings (“ratings”). Analyses of 391 agency ratings for 19 countries holding 39 presi-dential elections from 1987–2000, initially suggest that elections themselves prompt rating downgrades consistent with opportunistic PBC considerations, that incumbents are all likely to implement election-period policies detrimental to post-election creditworthiness. But more refined analyses, integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations in a unified framework, suggest that election-period agency downgrades (upgrades) are more likely as right-wing (left-wing) incumbents, become more vulnerable to ouster by challengers. Together, these results underscore the importance of integrating both opportunistic and partisan PBC considerations into any explanation of election-period risk assessments of agencies and, perhaps, other private, foreign-based financial actors important to the pricing and allocation of capital for lending and investment in the developing world. 1