Schrödinger, Szilard, and the emergence of the EPR argument

Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen’s “Can quantum mechanical description of reality be considered complete?”(1935) and Schrödinger’s “Die gegenwärtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik” (1936) are commonly accepted as the seminal papers for the modern study of quantum mechanical entanglement. However, not much has been known about the prehistory of these papers. We were able to trace the development of both Einstein’s and Schrödinger’s thought, using Schrödinger’s correspondence and especially his extensive research notes. We especially found that they both got important input from Leo Szilard, who proposed in 1931 a thought experiment that is a direct precursor to the EPR experiment and a quantum mechanical state that is essentially identical to the EPR state

On variable non-dependence of first-order formulas

In this paper, we introduce a concept of non-dependence of variables in formulas. A formula in first-order logic is non-dependent of a variable if the truth value of this formula does not depend on the value of that variable. This variable non-dependence can be subject to constraints on the value of some variables which appear in the formula, these constraints are expressed by another first-order formula. After investigating its basic properties, we apply this concept to simplify convoluted formulas by bringing out and discarding redundant nested quantifiers. Such convoluted formulas typically appear when one uses a translation function interpreting a theory into another

Externalist Medicine and Externalist Biology

This paper assesses the prospects for an externalist perspective for somatic medicine—the view that health and disease of the body might sometimes be constitutively dependent on factors external to the organism. After briefly reviewing the grounds for psychiatric externalism, I argue that similar considerations are already implicit in somatic medical practice, particularly in immunology, public/population health, and occupational therapy. I then argue that the interactionist and population-minded externalist approach to biomedicine represents an important practical application of more general trends in biological theory; namely, the growing rejection of individualistic and reductionistic thinking

Understanding (and) Machine Learning's Black Box Explanation Problems

Machine learning (ML) is a major scientific success. Yet, ML models are notoriously considered black boxes, where this black boxness may refer to details of the ML model itself or details concerning its outcomes. Hence, there is a flourishing field of "eXplainable Artificial Intelligence" (XAI), providing means for rendering several aspects of ML more transparent. However, given their tremendous success, why would we even want to explain black boxed ML models with XAI? I here suggest that, in order to answer this question, we first need to distinguish between proximate and ultimate aims in using XAI: While the proximate aim may be uniformly to provide instruments for explaining aspects of ML to relevant stakeholders, the ultimate aim varies with the context of deployment. Furthermore, I argue that in science, the ultimate aim is the understanding of scientific phenomena. I then sketch three paths along which understanding of phenomena may be gained by means of ML and XAI. In a coda, I address the possibility of gaining understanding from ML directly, without explanations and XAI

Deriving the Geodesic Principle

In the recent philosophy literature, there have been several attempts to use the seminal result by Geroch and Jang (1975) to precisify Harvey Brown’s claim that the geodesic principle can be recovered as a theorem in General Relativity, and then to critique it. We contend that the philosophical debate has unfolded in a curious way: even though Geroch and Jang’s paper contains two distinct approaches to the problem of geodesic motion, the philosophical literature has focused on only one of them. We then argue that the neglected approach offers an alternative—and more physical—set of resources to explain geodesic motion. Motivated by this approach, we prove a new “physical Geroch-Jang theorem,” which provides a scale-relative interpretation of the geodesic principle in General Relativity. We, thereby, make new resources available to re-evaluate Brown’s arguments as well as those of his critics

Virtually Impossible: Obstacles to Generalizing between Simulated and Real Humans

Virtually Impossible: Obstacles to Generalizing between Simulated and Real Human

Positively Misleading Errors

Positively misleading errors are errors of statistical reasoning in which adding data to an analysis will systematically and reliably strengthen support for an erroneous hypothesis over a correct one. This pattern distinguishes them from other errors of statistical inference and pattern recognition. Here I provide a general account of positively misleading errors by describing an exemplar case from biology along with a candidate case from clinical medicine. Though well known in biology (phylogenetic systematics, to be precise), positively misleading errors are likely more widespread and deserve to be brought to the attention of the wider research community. This will facilitate a better understanding of them and sharpen our ability to assess statistical and probabilistic methods, providing resources for researchers to more effectively identify, diagnose, and dislodge these errors of statistical inference. This reflects the way we have gained a better understanding of scientific reasoning from studying other errors of statistical and probabilistic reasoning

Disorder

This paper begins with some brief intellectual autobiography, recalling my first engagement with philosophy of biology. The substantive part of the paper then focuses on the plurality of possible classifications central to the theses of scientific disunity and metaphysical disorder developed in my early career. After discussing this in terms of biological classification, and introducing the reasons for thinking of classifications as typically value-laden, I discuss two sets of human classifications bearing on normatively vital questions, those around sex and gender and those involved in the distinctions between human races

Revisiting the Base in Evidence-Based Policy

Evidence-based policy (EBP) has become widely embraced for its commitment to greater uptake of scientific knowledge in policymaking. But what legitimizes EBP and in what respect are evidence-based policymaking practices better than other policymaking practices? In this article, we distinguish and refine three potential legitimizers of EBP. We suggest that evidence-based policymaking practices are better because they "follow the science," because they focus on "what works," or because they "follow the rules." We discuss some consequences, for advocates of EBP, of consciously adopting one or other of these legitimizers. Finally, we examine whether it is appropriate to switch from advocating for EBP to advocating for evidence-informed policy

Perspectives in and on Quantum Theory

I take a pragmatist perspective on quantum theory. This is not a view of the world described by quantum theory. In this view quantum theory itself does not describe the physical world (nor our observations, experiences or opinions of it). Instead, the theory offers reliable advice—on when to expect an event of one kind or another, and on how strongly to expect each possible outcome of that event. The event’s actual outcome is a perspectival fact—a fact relative to a physical context of assessment. Measurement outcomes and quantum states are both perspectival. By noticing that each must be relativized to an appropriate physical context one can resolve the measurement problem and the problem of nonlocal action. But if the outcome of a quantum measurement is not an absolute fact, then why should the statistics of such outcomes give us any objective reason to accept quantum theory? One can describe extensions of the scenario of Wigner’s friend in which a statement expressing the outcome of a quantum measurement would be true relative to one such context but not relative to another. However, physical conditions in our world prevent us from realizing such scenarios. Since the outcome of every actual quantum measurement is certified at what is essentially a single context of assessment, the outcome relative to that context is an objective fact in the only sense that matters for science. We should accept quantum theory because the statistics these outcomes display are just those it leads us to expect