Gender Identity and Birth Certificates: The Surrogacy Nexus

This Article confronts and responds to the weaponization of birth certificates in recent controversies around gender identity by drawing parallels between gender identity and intentional parentage. A juxtaposition of gender identity with parentage identity reveals that they share the common underpinning of self-identification, raising the question why birth certificates are permitted to reflect one’s parentage identity but, as has been suggested in numerous controversies involving transgender litigants, not one’s gender identity. This Article argues that, for the same reasons that a surrogacy arrangement permits the parties to it to define for themselves who are the legal parents of the child they plan to create, a gender marker on a birth certificate should also be a matter of self-definition. This Article emphasizes that basing a law of gender determination on inflexible categories defined by outward anatomical differences furthers no defensible public policy and indeed is in direct conflict with evolving understandings of gender and human rights

Why We Should Stop Talking About Violent Offenders: Storytelling and Decarceration

The movement to decarcerate risks foundering because of its failure to grapple with so-called violent offenders, who make up nearly half of U.S. prisoners. The treatment of people serving sentences for offenses categorized as violent is a primary reason for the continued problem of mass incarceration, despite widespread awareness of the phenomenon and significant bipartisan interest in its reduction. People convicted of “violent offenses” are serving historically anomalous and excessively long sentences, are generally denied clemency and compassionate release, and are excluded from a wide array of legal reform and policy changes with decarceral aims. Keeping these people in prison for life or near-life sentences is extraordinarily expensive for state budgets, largely unnecessary from a public safety perspective, and cruel and unusual punishment from the viewpoint of international and historical standards. While the moral imperative to release those serving draconian sentences for nonviolent drug offenses is widely if not universally accepted, such efforts will ultimately be a drop in the bucket if we fail to address the 58% of state prisoners who are serving sentences for offenses categorized as violent. Quantitative data about the low rates of recidivism for people released after serving long sentences for “violent offenses” will not alone shift the focus of our policies or politics. Rather, we need to develop a more nuanced understanding of “violent offenses” and “violent offenders” by hearing the voices of people who have been directly impacted by violence and by the system’s response to violence. These are, in many cases, the same people. Their stories are complex and human, defying simplistic narratives about innocent victims and bad offenders. Storytelling offers possibilities for reconceptualizing the stale terminology around violence and for shifting the discourse. This Article draws on insights from the literature on epistemic injustice and criminal law democratization, together with the legal storytelling literature. It explores the power of storytelling as an advocacy tool in the slow work of person-by-person decarceration during back-end processes like clemency, parole, and compassionate release, as well as part of the broader movement for systemic decarceration. Storytelling is an important tool for advocates working within the system, as well as for abolitionists seeking to end the system. In some contexts, advocates and activists are best situated to tell these stories, but ultimately people should be given the opportunity and tools to tell their own stories

Front Matter

Front Matter for Volume 45, Issue 1 of Michigan Journal of International La

Independence Through Judicialization: The Politics Surrounding Administrative Adjudicators, 1929-1949

One front in today’s battle to define the scope of the administrative state concerns the authority, status, and future of its 10,000-plus administrative adjudicators. Decisions by federal courts and the executive branch to increase the dependence of administrative adjudicators on the executive have sparked strong reactions from observers, with many advocating for measures to increase adjudicator “independence.” But who should administrative adjudicators be independent of, which ought to be independent, and why? Calls for administrative adjudicator independence are not new. This Article draws on primary documents produced by private actors, congressional decisionmakers, and federal executive agents to present a political legal history of legislative proposals between 1929 and 1949 to understand whether, how, and why different actors sought to insulate administrative adjudicators from their agencies or the President. Leading up to and following the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, politicians and interested citizens advanced proposals to increase the independence of the individuals who conducted hearings and served as factfinders in administrative agencies. Then, like now, observers debated administrative adjudicator independence in the context of discussions about the power of administrative agencies. The loudest supporters of independence were anti-New Dealers trying to halt and reverse the growth of administrative power, who were joined by a subset of legal professionals interested in using law to check its operation. These critics attempted to “judicialize” administrative adjudication by increasing the resemblance of administrative adjudicators to the federal judiciary. What does this history teach? First, it illustrates how actors past and present deploy seemingly apolitical terms like judicial values, independence, or administrative procedure to obtain substantive political ends. Indeed, such terms can take on different meanings at different times, perhaps varying with views of the federal judiciary and active government, the policies and political strength of the President, the issues decided by administrative agencies, or the types of claimants subject to adjudication. Second, it highlights how early supporters of administrative agencies emphasized the diversity among administrative adjudicators, while opponents grouped them together to collectively limit their authority. Today, rather than pursuing one-size-fits-all reforms, I suggest that different rules should apply to different administrative adjudicators depending on the questions and claimants involved. Decisions about ratemaking or regulatory enforcement differ from individualized determinations whether citizens qualify for government benefits or licenses. Claims by business interests might be treated differently from those by more vulnerable groups, such as disability-benefits recipients or noncitizens at risk of removal. In any event, when making policy recommendations, reformers should begin by understanding who administrative adjudicators are and the functions they perform, an understanding that also underscores whether and how politics should animate arguments about adjudicator independence

Beyond Profit Motives

A review of The Profit Motive: Defending Shareholder Value Maximization By Stephen M. Bainbridge

Researching antitrust law

Antitrust is a dynamic area of law subject to rapid change. It is highly sensitive to the attitudes of regulators and market conditions, always looking forward to how decisions made today will affect businesses and the lives of individual consumers. Current events — and passionate consumers, or fans — can incur “Swift” antitrust scrutiny, as Live Nation Entertainment discovered recently. Yet it is inextricably linked to more abstract considerations. The term “antitrust” is itself archaic, reflecting animosity to a business practice innovated by Standard Oil in 1882. Understanding the history of antitrust actions often requires understanding something of history broadly and politics specifically. Finally, applying antitrust law requires some grasp of economic principles such as efficiency, market power, and network effects. One book on the subject begins with the line, “Perhaps no field of law is as dominated by economics as antitrust law.” With all this in mind, there is simply a lot that may be relevant when working on an antitrust or competition law problem. This column will attempt to point out some helpful resources for practitioners working in this field

Review of \u3cem\u3eThe Movement for Black Lives: Philosophical Perspectives\u3c/em\u3e

Philosophy gets a bad rap when it comes to its engagement with the world’s most pressing social problems. Recall that famous epigrammatic final note from Karl Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” It may be tempting to take this line as a call to substitute studious reasoning for an “act first, think later” strategy. But that doesn’t seem to be Marx’s intention. Rather than being a call for “blind activism” that rejects “rational dialogue, discourse, or discussion,” Marx is better read as challenging philosophy to avoid becoming a barren discipline disconnected from social struggle (Cornel West, The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1991], 68–69). Marx’s point, in other words, was not that philosophers should move aside and let the activists handle things. Instead, he wanted to recommend a more purposeful role for philosophy in our society: a philosophy that informs activism and other social activity

Front Matter

Front Matter for Volume 29, Issue 1 of Michigan Journal of Race & La

The Humanization of War Reparations: Combatant Deaths and Compensation in Unlawful Wars

Recent events have sparked a renewed interest in the law and practice of war reparations. While today it is uncontroversial that unlawful uses of force, including acts of aggression, entail the obligation of the wrongdoing state to make reparations, including by way of compensation, the precise extent of this obligation remains subject to debate. One particularly contentious aspect is whether, and to what extent, states that violate the prohibition on the use of force are obligated to pay compensation not only for harm caused to civilians and civilian objects, but also for damage caused to the armed forces of the defending state. In this article, we demonstrate that states that engage in unlawful uses of force are indeed obligated to provide compensation for this type of harm. However, we also explain how issues of causation, evidentiary standards, and the financial capacity of the wrongdoing state may in some cases limit the scope of such claims. Moreover, we demonstrate that compensating combatants is not only doctrinally sound but also normatively desirable as it highlights their role as the core victims of unlawful wars. Finally, we elaborate on some of the consequences of this conclusion, including in relation to the individualization of reparation claims, the moral and legal equality of combatants, as well as the normative principles underlying international humanitarian law (“IHL”)

Preparing Future Lawyers to Draft Contracts and Communicate with Clients in the Era of Generative AI

Thank you all for coming today. This is, I think, a really important topic. Important enough that the conference has decided to have two talks on the same topic, and Mark will be presenting on this in the next session, too. I plan on attending because I don’t think you can get enough perspectives on it right now. And hearing this information, I had to attend several talks myself before I really digested it and understood what this was all about. So, I hope that I can give you a little bit of that today. My name is Kristen Wolff. I am Clinical Assistant Professor at the University of Michigan. I co-teach in the Zell Entrepreneurship Clinic, supervising students who are providing free transactional legal services to early-stage startups, mostly in the University of Michigan ecosystem. Today, I’m going to talk about integrating generative AI into transactional law classes. The first half of the talk I’m going to try to make the case for “why.” Why we should do this? And then, hoping that some of you all bought into it, the second half will explore how we might do it