Grid Reliability in the Electric Era

The United States has delegated the weighty responsibility of keeping the lights on to a self-regulatory organization called the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC). Despite the fact that NERC is one of the largest and most important examples of industry-led governance—and regulates in an area that is central to our economy and basic human survival—this unusual institution has received scant attention from policymakers and scholars. Such attention is overdue. To achieve deep decarbonization, the United States must enter a new “electric era,” transitioning many sectors to run on electricity while also transforming the electricity system itself to run largely on clean but intermittent renewable resources. These new resources demand new approaches to electric grid reliability—approaches that the NERC model of reliability governance may inadequately deliver. This Article traces NERC’s history, situates NERC in ongoing debates about climate change and grid reliability, and assesses the viability of reliability self-regulation in the coming electric era. It may have made sense to delegate the task of maintaining U.S. electric grid reliability to a self-regulatory organization in prior decades, when regulated monopolies managed nearly every segment of electricity production. But many of the criteria that NERC used to justify self-regulation earlier in its history—electric utilities’ expertise, widespread agreement about the organization’s goals, and an industry structure in which regulated parties’ interests align with the public’s—no longer hold. The climate crisis creates a need for expertise beyond NERC’s domain, while the introduction of competition to large parts of the electricity sector blurs lines of accountability for reliability failures. NERC’s structure also perpetuates an incumbency bias at odds with public goals for the energy transition. These shifting conditions have caused NERC to fail to keep pace with the reliability challenges of the electric era. Worse still, outdated NERC standards often help entrench fossil fuel interests by justifying electricity market rules poorly suited to accommodate renewable resources. We therefore suggest a suite of reforms that would increase direct government oversight and accountability in electricity reliability regulation

Adventure Capital

This symposium Article traces the history and rise of venture capital and venture-backed startups in the United States from a business law perspective and explores the current big questions in the field. This examination highlights that after lawmakers shaped the enabling environment for venture capital to flourish, corporate and securities law has responded to the rise of venture-backed startups incrementally but with profound effect. Although business law has not always fit easily with the distinctive features of venture backed startups, it has provided an enormous space in the private realm for them to order their governance and maneuver with relative freedom. This private realm is a good fit for the needs of startups that drive economic growth and innovation, but their activity can also create lingering issues of social costs and policy that are difficult to address. Grappling with this reality is essential to continuing to foster a vibrant venture capital ecosystem while also developing a coherent business law response to the current wild era of “adventure capital.

The Surprising Culprit Behind Declining US Antitrust Enforcement

In contrast to a recent paper that argues the decline in antitrust enforcement over recent decades is due largely to the political influence of big business, Herbert Hovenkamp argues that small businesses and trade associations have historically had more influence over antitrust policy, often lobbying for less competition and higher prices

Private Equity, Conflicts, and Chapter 11: The Three Types of Attorney Conflicts that Undermine Corporate Restructuring

Private equity has become a dominant force in distressed investing and Chapter 11 corporate reorganization. As a result, three new types of attorney conflicts have emerged, each of which threatens to undermine the efficacy and credibility of the bankruptcy system. Bankruptcy judges, practitioners, and scholars must respond. This Comment provides those stakeholders with a doctrinal and normative framework to understand the conflicts that pervade the system. In particular, this Comment defines three types of conflicts, explains how each threatens the functionality of Chapter 11 corporate restructuring, lays the doctrinal groundwork for a new understanding of attorney disinterestedness, and provides solutions to mitigate the relevant conflicts. In doing so, this Comment provides much-needed guidance to bankruptcy stakeholders who are keen to ensure debtor estates receive competent, loyal, and zealous representation

Local in a Peculiar Way: The Police Force in American Law

This Article sets out to pinpoint the locus of control over the police. Running the police force is one of the most important tasks assigned to local governments in America. Yet heretofore policing has not been analyzed through the lens of local government law. Through a review of state statutes, this Article reveals that the reigning notion that the police are local oversimplifies a complex legal reality. Local governments are mostly empowered to choose to establish (or not establish) a police force and to define the force’s size and role. However, they are mostly not afforded concomitant full powers over the police workforce. Issues pertaining to officers’ employment status—hiring, service terms, and, most significantly, removal—are heavily regulated through state mandates. Because these mandates are almost always geared toward aggressively protecting officers’ rights, local governments are left largely bereft of means to discipline officers who misbehave. This division of powers— whereby the local government mostly controls the objectives and functions of a public service but does not enjoy similar levels of control over the workforce providing the service—is unique to policing. Powers over other important local functions do not follow this pattern. Moreover, local government law theories cannot justify this division of powers that withholds from the local government most powers over officers’ employment patterns. A principled analysis indicates that local control of the police workforce would in many instances contribute to economic efficiency and to democratic participation, the two values normally associated with local governance. The Article thus concludes by suggesting multiple doctrinal reforms that could begin to realign powers over the police force. Such reforms are of particular importance today as our system continues to grapple with the challenge of widespread police violence

Credit Markets and the Visible Hand: The Discount Window and the Macroeconomy

In times of crisis such as the 2008 financial crisis and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic central banks throughout the world engage in interventions with lasting effects on financial markets and the macroeconomy, for better and worse. The negative political consequences of these interventions—fears of politicizing central banking and inflationary concerns about dramatic interventions among them—can dampen the enthusiasm for such interventions early in the face of crisis. This dynamic creates a dilemma for the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, causing it to eschew interventions beyond monetary policy until the crisis has already crashed, at which point the Fed moves into every aspect of policy throughout the economy. This Article highlights the inadequacy of this dynamic. Sole reliance on monetary policy is insufficient in the face of growing crisis, while the Fed\u27s vast emergency lending facilities face ever stiffer political, inflationary, and equity concerns. The Article advocates instead for a new approach to macroeconomic stability, not just through monetary policy or emergency interventions, but through judicious use of the sleeping giant of Fed policy, the bank-intermediated discount window. Focusing on the problematic credit market for debtors-in-possession in the midst of bankruptcy, the Article suggests a reformed system that safeguards the Fed, supports small and medium-sized enterprises, and stabilizes the macroeconomy without exposing the system to the pockets of instability that the Fed’s overreliance on dramatic intervention can do

Stopping Stop the Steal Why Article II Doesn\u27t Let Legislatures Overturn Elections

The 2020 presidential race was hard fought—before Election Day, and after. The loser, Donald Trump, spent weeks pressuring state legislatures to overturn his defeats. His arguments hinged on Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which, his lawyers insisted, permitted legislatures to intervene. While no legislature did so in 2020, the specter of postelection legislative interference still threatens our elections and risks a constitutional crisis. This Article explains why Article II permits no such thing. Specifically, it argues that Article II’s grant of power—whatever its content—must be read as directed only toward pre-election legislatures, not postelection ones. This claim fills major gaps in the literature. First, previous scholarship assumes that Article II is silent, or ambiguous, on postelection interference. Blocking interventions would then depend on other authorities—like the Due Process Clause or state-constitutional provisions—ill-suited for the job. This Article shows, however, that Article II itself unambiguously bars postelection interference. Second, this Article sidesteps the debate about “independent state legislature” (ISL) theory—the focus of most scholarship on the 2020 election. Its argument holds, that is, regardless of what one believes about ISL doctrine. At the same time, this argument remains vital even after the Supreme Court snubbed ISL logic in Moore v. Harper. That decision leaves ample room, this Article argues, for Bush v. Gore-style debacles that foil state courts in constraining rogue legislatures. To support its position, this Article advances four separate contentions, each sufficient to compel the above conclusion. The first contention analyzes Article II’s text according to intratextualist principles. The second unpacks the Framers’ original understanding of Article II. The third examines the original understanding behind Congress’s election-timing statute, which gives effect to Article II, Section 1, Clause 4. The fourth analyzes constitutional purpose. Finally, this Article also explains why the original understanding of Congress’s election-day statute—which let legislatures handpick presidential electors if their state “fail[ed]” to choose on Election Day—did not permit such handpicking after the 2020 election

The Key-Stone to the Arch : Unlocking Section 13\u27s Original Meaning

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania holds that Section 13 of the State’s constitution, which prohibits all “cruel punishments,” is coextensive with the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits only punishments that are both “cruel and unusual.” Rather than analyze the state provision independently, the court defers to the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. This, says the court, is because Pennsylvania history does not provide evidence that the Commonwealth’s prohibition differs from the federal one. And without that historical basis, the court believes it is bound by federal precedent. This is mistaken. History reveals that Pennsylvanians had a distinct, original understanding of “cruelty.” The U.S. Supreme Court has said that the original meaning of the federal provision parroted English criminal prohibitions, permitted retributive justifications, and proscribed only pain superadded beyond death through methods left in the past. This understanding is irreconcilable with the original meaning of Section 13. The Commonwealth’s provision, by contrast, parroted Enlightenment criminal philosophy, permitted only deterrence and rehabilitative justifications, and prohibited the addition of any severity contemporary science deemed unnecessary for those ends. The historical record should thus provide, not prevent, a distinctly Pennsylvanian definition of cruelty. This article provides that historical account. It reviews the influence of Montesquieu and Beccaria’s writings on the speeches, pamphlets, and debates of founding Pennsylvanians. It also traverses the text, legislative history, and early Supreme Court of Pennsylvania interpretation of the first penal laws in the Independent State. This penal code, which circumscribed capital punishment and augured the age of the penitentiary, distilled the distinctly Pennsylvania conception of “cruelty” into law. This was the philosophy Pennsylvanians encapsulated in their prohibition on cruel punishments. Section 13 jurisprudence should therefore build—independently—from the original meaning Pennsylvania’s history supplies