Misappropriation of Drawing Power (Free-Riding) in Trademarks

This Article advances the cause of action regarding the Misappropriation of Drawing Power (“free-riding”). It is a form of anti-dilution, along the lines of European Union laws regarding parasitism, and is analogous to other laws such as the protection of personality rights. It could also help settle long-standing debates in the trademark field, such as those regarding dilution by blurring, initial-interest confusion, comparative advertising, and whether and how to protect marks beyond the geographical scope of the plaintiff’s sales (such as protecting U.S. marks used internationally)

2 Riverside Drive LLC v. Truth

The landlord sued the tenant for unpaid rent from October 2021 through August 2023. The court granted the landlord\u27s motion for default judgment against the tenant for $40,425, plus costs and disbursements. The court also allowed the landlord to seek an additional judgment for attorney fees, but the amount will be determined later based on further documentation. Key legal points: The tenant did not appear in court. The landlord established that the tenant was a month-to-month tenant after the expiration of their lease. The landlord provided evidence of the unpaid rent amount. The court was skeptical of the landlord\u27s requested attorney fees of$20,000 and required further documentation

71 Washington Place Owners, Inc. v. Resnicow

The court reached three decisions in this case. 3/3. The landlord sought to evict the tenant due to repeated instances of objectionable conduct, including verbally assaulting other shareholders and staff, trespassing, and engaging in disruptive behavior. The court ruled in favor of the landlord, finding that the decision to terminate the lease was protected by the business judgment rule and that the tenant failed to demonstrate bad faith or discrimination on the part of the landlord. Key Legal Points: Courts will generally defer to decisions made by boards of directors in business settings; shareholders have a right to expect reasonable behavior from other shareholders; and cooperatives have broad discretion to make decisions about the management of their buildings

Rock-Park 94 LLC v. CAMBA, Inc.

The court dismissed the landlord\u27s complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the premises were not rent stabilized, ejectment of the tenant CAMBA Inc., use and occupancy, and attorneys\u27 fees. The court found the premises were subject to rent stabilization as the landlord\u27s claimed exemptions were invalid. The waiver of rent stabilization in the lease was contrary to law and unenforceable. Without a proper termination notice under the Rent Stabilization Code, the ejectment claim failed. The ancillary claims for use and occupancy and fees were also dismissed

Jemrock Realty Co., LLC v. Sternberg

Landlord sued tenants (son and daughter-in-law of deceased tenant) claiming they didn\u27t qualify for succession due to frequent absences from the apartment. Court denied landlord\u27s motion for summary judgment, finding issues of fact regarding primary residence and excusable absences require a trial. Additionally, the younger tenant didn\u27t qualify for the senior citizen co-occupancy exception. Key points: 1) Tenants seeking succession must prove primary residence. 2) Temporary absences may be excusable. 3) Disabled person exception requires proof of major life activity limitation. 4) Senior citizen co-occupancy only applies to tenants 62 or older at the original tenant\u27s death

Fostering Faith: Religion and Inequality in the History of Child Welfare Placements

Each year in the United States, approximately 700,000 children live in foster care. Many of these children are placed in religiously oriented homes recruited and overseen by faith-based agencies (FBAs). This arrangement—as well as the scope and operation of child welfare services more broadly—is at a crucial moment of reckoning. Scholars and advocates focused on children’s rights and family integrity maintain that the child welfare system, increasingly termed the “family policing system,” harms children, families, and communities through unnecessary and racist child removal that is partly motivated by perverse financial incentives. Some call for abolition. Meanwhile, in a largely separate conversation, discussants focused on clashes between religious liberty rights and antidiscrimination laws spar over the legality and appropriateness of FBA involvement in fostering children because FBAs may exclude or provide ill-fitting services to LGBTQ individuals and religious minorities. This Article excavates the persistent involvement of religious organizations in child placements in U.S. history to provide crucial missing context and valuable lessons for ongoing reform efforts. People and groups motivated by religion have participated in housing poor, orphaned, and otherwise dependent children since the colonial period, gradually securing laws to ensure public funding for their private organizations and to safeguard control over coreligionist youth. Though these services have benefitted many children in the absence of satisfactory public alternatives, they have also inflamed interfaith controversies and left children from minority religious and racial groups with unequal and inadequate care. Criminal law innovations, including the enactment of child abuse laws and the creation of juvenile courts, reinforced religious organizations’ involvement. As the preferred methods for child placement evolved, faith based providers campaigned in legislatures and the press to preserve their power and control, slowing reforms. This Article’s account supports calls for reform by emphasizing how the modern system developed through ad hoc and contingent changes that routinely prioritized cost concerns, crime reduction, and religious groups’ interests over children’s wellbeing

If We Could Talk to the Animals, How Should We Discuss Their Legal Rights?

The intricate tapestry of animal communication has long fascinated humanity, with the sophisticated linguistics of cetaceans holding a special place of intrigue due to the cetaceans’ significant brain size and apparent intelligence. This Essay explores the legal implications of the recent advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically machine learning and neural networks, that have made significant strides in deciphering sperm whale (Physeter macrocephalus) communication. We view the ability of a being to communicate as one—but not the only—potential pathway to qualify for legal rights. As such, we investigate the possibility that the ability to communicate should trigger legal rights for beings capable of communicating, whether they be cetaceans or other creatures. As the Cetacean Translation Initiative (CETI) project, which is actively working to unlock sperm whale language, moves closer to enabling meaningful human-cetacean dialogue, we stand on the precipice of a transformative understanding that may compel a radical reevaluation of animal legal rights and, perhaps, human legal rights as well. In fact, viewing eligibility for legal rights through a more objective lens, such as a communication criterion, may even improve our understanding of human legal rights, their origins, extent, application, and even entitlement itself. We begin with an overview of animal communication, emphasizing the complex acoustic patterns of sperm whale songs and clicks, which have been captured and analyzed through the collaborative efforts of marine biologists and computer scientists. This cross-disciplinary effort has yielded what the Dominica Sperm Whale Project has named “Flukebook”—a robust dataset that informs machine-learning models with acoustic signals, contextual behavioral data, genetic data, and geospatial information—that opens the door to the potential of an interspecies large language model (LLM) useful for communication among sperm whales and humans. Having established that the prospect of communicating with another species is becoming increasingly feasible, we then delve into the philosophical and ethical considerations that accompany such a breakthrough. Drawing upon the perspectives of thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham, Professor Peter Singer, and Professor Martha Nussbaum, we investigate the ethical foundations for considering the legal rights of cetaceans, or other nonhuman animals. This investigation is juxtaposed with historical whaling laws and modern legal frameworks, probing the adequacy of current laws, norms, practices, and attitudes regarding emerging interspecies communication. Finally, we propose a novel legal paradigm that contends with the implications of cetacean communication capabilities. As we inch toward potentially understanding requests, preferences, or even rules or laws of sperm whales, the ethical imperative to reexamine their legal standing becomes undeniable. This Essay examines practical legal issues such as jurisdiction, standing, representation, autonomy, and the feasibility of animal citizenship. In fact, it envisions innovative legal constructs such as a “Magna Carta Cetacea” and a “United Species” extension of the United Nations. In addition, we endeavor to articulate an objective standard by which any being capable of the requisite communication qualifies for legal rights. In this potential legal frontier, the communication of preferences by an animal may necessitate that we seriously consider conferring legal rights to those animals. This groundbreaking dialogue could not only elevate the rights of whales, but also provoke a broader discussion about the principles underlying human legal rights themselves, challenging our current anthropocentric legal systems to evolve. As we decode the “codas” of sperm whales, we are challenged to reenvision the legal and normative matrix of life on Earth and our place within it, guided by potential principles such as mutual respect and legal recognition that transcend species boundaries

Chillo v. Lopez

In this Nonpayment case, the court granted the tenant\u27s motion to vacate a pro se stipulation entered into during litigation. The stipulation was vacated because the court found that the tenant, who was unrepresented at the time, entered into it improvidently. The petition filed by the landlord was defective as it alleged inconsistent facts regarding the regulatory status of the apartment, which formed a viable defense for the tenant. As a result, the court vacated the stipulation and returned the parties to their original positions, setting aside the judgment and warrant. The proceeding was adjourned for further motions, and the tenant was given the opportunity to file an answer