The Death of the Legal Author: Authority, Intention, and Law-Creation in the Advent of GenAI

Generative artificial intelligence in the form of chatbots based on large language models (LLMs) has taken the world of law by storm. Philosophy of law is struggling to catch up with the theoretical significance of the advent of technological development and the way it may modify traditionally established understanding of legal phenomena, such as law-creation and authority. In this sense, for the most part, heated philosophical debates have circled around a normative question: ‘Should AI create and interpret law?’. Much less attention has been given to a different, albeit previous, question: ‘Can AI create and interpret law?’ That is, is AI capable of producing outputs that can be deemed as ‘law’ (at least, law as we know it)? Can AI be a ‘legal author’? This paper explores this unattended question and endeavours to provide some provisional answers. In the first part, we define legal authority, legal authorship, and legal interpretation and claim that the intention of a determinate authoritative author is often considered the condition of the possibility of creating and interpreting contemporary legal texts. In the second part, we argue that LLM AI, in general, and ChatGPT, in particular, generate legal texts without having any intention. In the third part, we consider the positions of the authors that downplay or even eliminate intention from the discussions about the legal character of prescriptive texts. 4. Finally, we argue that there are good reasons to side with the second group of authors. The ability of agents without intentions, like ChatGPT, to create legal text is an argument in favour of the thesis that law can be created without intention behind the creation and that nonintentional creation can be interpreted to arrive at legal norms

Principle of legality in international criminal law

Предмет истраживања овог рада јесте место, а поготово садржина начела законитости у међународном кривич- ном праву. Аутор најпре излаже укратко о начелу законитости уопште, те чини упоредноправни приказ тог начела у континен- тално-европском и англоамеричком правном систему. Потом се прелази на историјску генезу начела законитости у међународном кривичном праву, те се у том смислу посебна пажња посвећује раду међународних војних трибунала у Нирнбергу и Токију, али и аd hoc међународних кривичних трибунала Савета безбедности УН за бившу Југославију и Руанду. Аутор закључује да је начело закони- тости део општег међународног кривичног права, али да је оно у том праву схваћено на преширок начин, као sui generis начело зако- нитости. У том погледу се указује и на покушај да се одредбама Римског статута Међународног кривичног суда и у међународном кривичном праву начело законитости што је више могуће уподоби значењу тог начела у континентално-европском праву. Коначно, у раду је изложен и ауторов став о начелу законитости у контексту непосредне примене међународног кривичног права у унутрашњем кривичноправном амбијенту.The subject of this paper is the r esearch of the place and substance of the principle of legality within the framework of the International Criminal Law. Firstly, the author briefly shows the main features of the said principle in general and compares its status in Continental and Anglo- American (common law) legal systems. Afterwards, he researches the historical genesis of the principle of legality in the International Criminal Law and especially its place in the practice of International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo and the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals of the UN Security Council for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The author concludes that the principle of legality, more famously expressed through Latin maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, exists in the Customary International Law, but in a form that is too extensive, as a principle of legality sui generis. In this regard, it is pointed out that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court has made an attempt to bring the meaning of the principle of legality in the International Criminal Law closer to the one it has in the Continental Criminal Law system. However, the Rome Statute is still considered to represent particular International (Criminal) Law and as such its provisions, including the ones concerning the principle of legality, apply only to the member states of the Statute. Finally, the author is putting forward his stance regarding the issue of the direct application of the International Criminal Law in the national legal systems, in the context of the principle of legality

The Influence of the Common Law System on the Construction of International Criminal Law : some Preliminary Considerations

The influence of common law on international criminal law is analyzed in this paper. Within the broad spectrum to be analyzed, the paper focuses on the influence of common law on the trend towards judicial creativity in international criminal tribunals. This creativity is reflected, at least, in the determination of customary norms and general principles of law. Similarly, this paper examines the influence of common law on the shaping of rules of evidence and procedure in the various international criminal tribunals existing to date

Methodological predecessors of contextualist political realism

In order to gain a better understanding of contemporary political realism, as well as of the theories of two classical political philosophers, this paper argues that the methodological roots of a contextualist model of realism can be found, among others, in the writings of Aristotle and Machiavelli. It is argued that the methodological assumptions of contextualist political realism can be formulated through two main notions: 1) the experiential basis - analysis of politics through reliance on experience from political practice; and 2) contextualism - avoiding universal claims as much as possible, i.e., making claims about politics always within a socio-historical context. Using those lenses, the paper points out the methodological elements of Aristotles and Machiavellis political theories that are in line with this version of political realism, claiming both of them could be perceived as forerunners to a certain degree

On The axiological dimension of law

У фокусу овог рада налазе се нека општетео- ријска и филозофскоправна разматрања о аксиолошкој димензији права. Право као регулатор друштвених односа није вредносно не- утрална категорија. У право се преливају одређене друштвене вред- ности тако што се везују за његове даље, главне циљеве, који су ванправног карактера. О аксиолошкој димензији права треба да воде рачуна сви фактори који учествују у процесу стварања, при- мене и научне обраде права. Најпогоднији механизам посредством којег се свет вредности прелива у свет права представљају правна начела. Њихов ratio је управо осмишљавање правних норми неким дубљим и трајнијим вредностима. Због тога су правна начела но- сиоци цивилизацијске мисије права. Све правне вредности можемо класификовати у две групе: материјалне и техничке правне вред- ности. Материјалне правне вредности генеришу се из каталога општих друштвених вредности и њихова је мисија да правна бића испуне одговарајућим смислом и сврхом. Техничке правне вредности производи само право, тежећи да обезбеди унутрашњу смисаоност правног система и његову способност за ефикасну примену.This paper focuses on some general theoretical and philosophicallegal considerations on the axiological dimension of law. Law as a regulator of social relations is not a value-neutral category. Certain social values permeate into law by being linked to its further, overarching goals, which are of a non-legal nature. All factors participating in the process of creation, application, and scholarly treatment of law should take into account the axiological dimension of law. Legal principles represent the most suitable mechanism through which the world of values permeates into the world of law. Their ratio lies precisely in shaping legal norms according to deeper and more enduring values. Therefore, legal principles bear the civilizational mission of law. All legal values can be classified into two groups: material and technical legal values. Material legal values are generated from the catalog of general social values, and their mission is to imbue legal entities with appropriate meaning and purpose. Technical legal values are produced solely by law, aiming to ensure the internal meaningfulness of the legal system and its capacity for efficient application