Broader border taxes: a new option for European Union budget resources. Bruegel Policy Brief Issue 06/24, March 2024.

There is widespread agreement on the need for new resources to fund the European Union's budget in order to meet increasing spending demands, not least repayment of debt incurred as part of the EU’s post-pandemic economic recovery. In particular it is seen as desirable that the EU should have ‘own’ resources, or reliable ongoing revenue streams. But there is little agreement on what new own resources could consist of. Limited reform so far has led to the introduction of a levy paid by EU members depending on plastic packaging waste generated in their territory and not recycled. Meanwhile, the European Commission has proposed resources for the EU budget from emissions trading revenues, and from levies collected under the EU carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). There proposals are pragmatic and move in the right direction, but do not go far enough. The debate about own resources should focus on whether the EU will be able to build genuine own resources based on common tax policies. The EU suffers from ‘tax leakage’ in which profits are shifted from high-tax to low-tax EU countries, and from there onto no or low-tax non-EU jurisdictions, often without the application of withholding taxes. It may not be too much of a stretch to compare this situation of tax leakage with the situation addressed by CBAM – a quasi-tax at the border. So far, an opportunity for what could be seen as a tax at the border of the internal market, aiming to protect the market from harmful competition, may have been missed. Such a tax could reflect the undertaxed profit rule agreed as part of the international deal on the corporate minimum tax. Focusing on protecting the revenues of EU members by common tax borders could offer scope for new own resources

Exposure to generative artificial intelligence in the European labour market. Bruegel Working Paper, Issue 06/2024, 07 MARCH 2024.

We apply two sets of generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) occupational exposure scores – one task-based, one ability-based – to the European Labour Force Survey. While using different methodologies, our findings reveal consistent demographic patterns across the two approaches: jobs held by women, highly educated and younger workers are more exposed to GenAI technology in Europe. We also review the literature on the recent productivity impact of GenAI. Within the same occupations, less-experienced or less-skilled workers consistently get the largest productivity gains from GenAI support. We argue that a task-based analysis is more fruitful than an ability-based one, both for guiding GenAI adoption in organisations and their workplaces, and for assessing the employment and job quality impact on workers. Finally, we provide policy recommendations that can help workers (ie the labour supply) adjust to technological disruption, such as providing training and social safety nets. But we go further by also suggesting policy interventions that could redirect future labour demand towards better jobs, by promoting job redesign and organisational agility. Monitoring GenAI’s employment effects and researching the ‘jagged technological frontier’ is necessary to further build our understanding of the employment impact of this transformational technology

Global supply chains: lessons from a decade of disruption. Bruegel Working Paper Issue 05/2024, 04 March 2024.

This paper explores both the character and impact of three recent shocks to global supply chains: the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the US-China trade war. These were large shocks which have had significant impacts on domestic and international supply chains, but these impacts have differed in their longevity, economic impact and policy responses. We show that supply chains were remarkably resilient against shocks of such magnitude. However, this resilience was also achieved thanks to the equally remarkable size and scope of policy responses and global supply chain reorganisation. We recommend that pre-emptive policies may be justified to shield households and industry from future shocks. Given the entangled nature of these shocks and that their effects continue to reverberate, we emphasise the need for extensive future research to understand the nature of these shocks and the effectiveness of policy responses

Ukraine’s path to European Union membership and its long-term implications. Bruegel Policy Brief Issue 05/24, March 2024.

Whether and when Ukraine accedes to the European Union will depend greatly on how and when its war with Russia ends and post-war reconstruction starts, and how the EU handles issues of governance, security, migration, trade, investment, the energy transition, decarbonisation and the EU budget. The enlargement process is likely to overlap with post-war reconstruction, increasing the EU's influence in fostering Ukraine’s institutional development. Ukrainian leaders will have strong incentives to comply with the accession criteria, which the EU should use astutely to create a better-functioning economy and public institutions, especially by reducing opportunities for corruption. This will require clearer standards for rule-of-law and fundamental values, including effective tools to ensure continued compliance after accession. That is also the most effective way to ensure a positive impact of future enlargements on EU governance. The EU will also need to develop assistance programmes to help the Ukrainian government manage post-war external and internal security challenges, including the large number of weapons in circulation, and to encourage Ukrainian refugees to return to the country when possible, as they will be needed for the reconstruction effort. If the current EU budget rules were applied and there were no transitional arrangements – which is unlikely – we calculate the total annual cost of Ukraine's integration into the EU budget at 0.13 per cent of EU GDP, which would hardly change net recipient/payer positions of current EU members. Some of this funding would come back to the EU via EU companies participating in EU-funded projects in Ukraine. Ukraine’s entry into the EU would benefit EU GDP via trade, migration and foreign direct investment, boosting employment, production and tax revenues in the EU. The history of EU enlargement shows that the strongest motivation for difficult reforms is a credible and predictable accession process based on rewarding reforms. Both Ukraine and the EU would benefit from progressive integration of the country into EU policies, alongside the formal accession negotiations. That would show the Ukrainian public the tangible benefits of moving towards EU standards, while also bringing Ukraine into areas such as energy cooperation and decarbonisation

Incorporating the impact of social investments and reforms in the European Union’s new fiscal framework. Bruegel Working Papers, March 2024.

The European Union’s new fiscal framework aims to incentivise public investment and reforms by offering the option to extend the four-year fiscal adjustment period to seven years, thereby lowering the average annual fiscal adjustment requirement. EU countries can propose investment and reforms in the context of their national medium-term fiscal structural plans. When they do, these investments and reforms can be expected to also inform the fiscal adjustment proposed by member states. Yet, the EU lacks an agreed methodology for deciding on the potential quantitative impact of investment and reforms on the fiscal adjustment required under the new rules. This paper first analyses the ‘investment friendliness’ of the new framework. Although the incentives offered for raising investment are powerful, the bar for extending the adjustment period mainly through higher investment is high, and the design of the new rules will make it hard to actually raise investment. We next propose an approach for quantifying the impact of investment and reform on debt sustainability in the context of the new framework, taking into account uncertainty about their implementation and their economic effects. Such a methodology would also help the European Commission evaluate the impacts of recently adopted measures, the impacts of which are not yet observable. Developing this methodology will require revisiting the current commonly agreed methodologies for medium- and long-term capital stock and total factor productivity projections. We illustrate the potential impact of investment on debt sustainability analyses through calculations on three social investment measures, that is, combinations of reform and public spending that aim to increase human capital and labour force participations. While the impact of individual reforms on fiscal adjustment needs is generally modest, the combined impact of several measures could be notable

How can the European Union adapt to climate change? Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue n˚11/22 | June 2022.

Europe must increasingly deal with the harmful impacts of climate change, regardless of its success in reducing emissions. These impacts have significant cross-border effects and threaten to deepen existing divisions. Cooperation on adaptation, which is mostly seen as requiring local or regional efforts, may be useful, but the role of the European Union is ill-defined. We give an overview of how climate change might change Europe and how it might affect people and the economy. We also discuss what sort of adaptation policies are being pursued at EU level and on what grounds. We argue that a stronger adaptation governance framework would benefit adaptation efforts. We formulate three ideas to strengthen adaptation. First is a three-layered governance framework based on intensive cooperation to establish binding adaptation plans. Second is an EU-level insurance scheme against damages from climate change, with the size of national contributions tied to the achievement of self-chosen targets in adaptation plans. Our final suggestion is to increase ex-ante adaptation funding by targeting more spending under EU regional and agricultural policies specifically to adaptation in the most vulnerable regions

Measuring macroeconomic uncertainty during the euro’s lifetime. WORKING PAPER | ISSUE 10/2022 | 20 JUNE 2022.

To measure macroeconomic uncertainty, we start from observable forecasts of macroeconomic variables, which are transformations of underlying economic conditions. By observing how forecasts change over time, we measure the flow of macroeconomic surprises. The more intense the flow of surprises, the greater uncertainty can be said to be. Greater differences among forecasts are also evidence of uncertainty. We draw out four indicators of macroeconomic uncertainty, measured over the lifetime of the euro: 1. How the macroeconomic forecasts of a given institution for the same time period change over time; 2. How the macroeconomic forecasts of a given institution deviate from realised outcomes; 3. How the macroeconomic forecasts of different institutions deviate from one other; 4. How dispersed the forecasts of different professionals are. We also measure whether the ‘stag-‘ or the ‘-flationary’ component is stronger in the overall stagflationary shock caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine

The impact of artificial intelligence on the nature and quality of jobs. Bruegel WORKING PAPER | ISSUE 14/2022 | 27 JULY 2022.

Artificial intelligence (AI), like any workplace technology, changes the division of labour in an organisation and the resulting design of jobs. When used as an automation technology, AI changes the bundle of tasks that make up an occupation. In this case, implications for job quality depend on the (re)composition of those tasks. When AI automates management tasks, known as algorithmic management, the consequences extend into workers’ control over their work, with impacts on their autonomy, skill use and workload. We identify four use cases of algorithmic management that impact the design and quality of jobs: algorithmic work-method instructions; algorithmic scheduling of shifts and tasks; algorithmic surveillance, evaluation and discipline; and algorithmic coordination across tasks. Reviewing the existing empirical evidence on automation and algorithmic management shows significant impact on job quality across a wide range of jobs and employment settings. While each AI use case has its own particular effects on job demands and resources, the effects tend to be more negative for the more prescriptive (as opposed to supportive) use cases. These changes in job design demonstrably affect the social and physical environment of work and put pressure on contractual employment conditions as well. As technology development is a product of power in organisations, it replicates existing power dynamics in society. Consequently, disadvantaged groups suffer more of the negative consequences of AI, risking further job-quality polarisation across socioeconomic groups. Meaningful worker participation in the adoption of workplace AI is critical to mitigate the potentially negative effects of AI adoption on workers, and can help achieve fair and transparent AI systems with human oversight. Policymakers should strengthen the role of social partners in the adoption of AI technology to protect workers’ bargaining power

Mapping banking centres globally since 1970. Bruegel WORKING PAPER | ISSUE 12/2022 | 12 JULY 2022.

Brexit and the rise of China as a leading international economic power have revived discussions about the geography of banking centres. This paper analyses the geographical evolution of banking centres since the 1970s, based on a database constructed from a ranking of the top banks in the world created by The Banker magazine, a UK-based monthly publication specialised in international financial affairs. We describe both how the database was created and the ways in which it can be used to inform policy on money and capital markets. We address why the data can be used to proxy the size of International Financial Centres (IFCs) and the methodological limitations it may present. We find that banking consolidations and the evolution of the legal framework are more central to the changing geography of banking centres than economic and financial crises. We also highlight that, despite major shifts in global economic power, leading banking centres are hard to replace

Why the Ukraine crisis should push the UK and EU into a tighter embrace on security policy. CEPS Policy Contribution February 2022.

One of the costs of Brexit is the weakened ability of both the UK and the EU to shape a strong joint response to Russia’s threats to pan-European security. In the standoff over Ukraine, the need for close cross-Channel cooperation is particularly acute for any effective sanctions package negotiated with the US. Yet, post-Brexit relations between the UK and the EU are currently governed by a narrow Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) which does not include a designated chapter on political dialogue and that, barring a handful of exceptions, does not contain any provisions on cooperation on foreign and security matters. Fortunately, the preparatory work undertaken to reach the bilateral accord contains the answer to the question on how trust between the parties can be regained through procedural means. This policy brief highlights the embers of the Brexit bonfire that might be raked up to rekindle the flame of dialogue and cooperation between the UK and the EU in foreign affairs and security policy