Eliminating Ghostwriters: How a Federal Right of Publicity Can Save the Music Industry from Generative Artificial Intelligence

Copyright law is currently incapable of resolving challenges introduced by the use of generative artificial intelligence, or generative AI, in the music industry. This technology is being adopted by both copyright holders and licensees, as well as independent artists and third-party applications. In 2023, online producer Ghostwriter created a song (Heart on My Sleeve) directly influenced by copyrighted materials from global artists Drake and The Weeknd using AI technology. The composition garnered millions of listeners across social media and streaming platforms. However, neither the original artists nor their music group (i.e., Universal Music Group) provided Ghostwriter a license to utilize copyrighted works. This is just one instance illustrating how generative AI has created a global environment mired with vulnerable music industry stakeholders, complex questions of authorship and infringement, and an abundance of confused listeners. This Note examines current shortcomings of copyright law, analyzes recent examples of generative artificial intelligence impacting the music industry, and discusses current regulatory and common law guidance concerning AI technology. It will also study the music industry’s underlying concerns about AI-generated works and review the frail industry defenses being adopted against unpermitted users. Further, this Note proposes that a statutory federal right of publicity is the solution for the music industry to promote the advancement of generative AI technology while protecting copyright holders and licensees. This Note outlines the necessity of a statutory federal right of publicity before laying the groundwork for how it can be incorporated as a prong in the affirmative defense of fair use during a copyright analysis

Opening Remarks

Opening remarks for the 36th annual Red Clay Conference by University of Georgia Environmental Law Association Board Co-President Logan Berg

Public Domain and Access to Knowledge

In a world where truth is behind paywalls and lies are free, the importance of a realm of works that are free from copyright protection becomes even more important for access to knowledge and information. This Article considers a thriving and accessible public domain a key mechanism for engendering access to knowledge and propelling human development globally. The copyright public domain as a realm of freely accessible and usable works and elements of works is under immense threat due to the constant extension of the term of copyright protection, disparities in the scope of the public domain globally, the absence of legal mechanisms for public domain dedications in many jurisdictions, and the privatization of public domain resources. In light of an increasingly digital and borderless world, this Article calls for recognizing, protecting, and enriching the global public domain through international copyright rules. It examines how a positive regime that promotes the sustenance of and access to the public domain can be realized globally. The central point made in this Article is that a positive international framework, that supports the availability of public domain elements and prevents a regaining of monopoly over public domain resources, is essential for access to knowledge globally

“[T]here Appears to be Intentional Discrimination in the Panel”: The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Georgia

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court attempted to prevent peremptory strikes motivated by race. However, evidence and jurisprudence since Batson have indicated that the Court did not succeed. Furthermore, peremptory strikes perpetuate racial imbalance in juries and erode public faith in an unbiased legal system, as seen in reactions to the recent McMichael-Bryant trial in Georgia, in which only one black juror was seated. Given the longstanding and intractable issues with peremptory challenges, the Arizona Supreme Court decided to eliminate them entirely in 2021. This Article argues that Georgia should follow suit and abolish peremptory challenges

Remediation for PFAS Contamination: The Role of CERCLA Enforcement in Environmental Justice

PFAS are a family of manufactured chemicals that are highly persistent in the environment. Most people in the U.S. have been exposed to PFAS, but different groups of people may have higher exposure due to their environments. In recent years, peer-reviewed scientific studies have shown that PFAS are linked to numerous adverse human health effects. As a result, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has taken a variety of actions to address PFAS, including proposing to designate PFOS and PFOA, two chemicals in the PFAS family, as hazardous substances under CERCLA, or Superfund. CERCLA is the primary legal mechanism in the U.S. for ensuring that hazardous chemicals are removed from the environment, and this designation would be a first step in protecting communities from ongoing exposure to legacy PFAs contamination. In the U.S., communities of color and low-income communities disproportionately bear the burden of pollution from private industry and the government, and PFAS are no exception. Environmental justice demands equal treatment in enforcement of environmental laws, which means that communities with disproportionately high pollution burdens should be prioritized for cleanups under CERCLA. At the same time that legacy PFAS contamination is being taken seriously at the federal level, the Biden Administration has committed to prioritizing action on environmental justice. This Note explores whether the hazardous substance designation, in combination with policies and guidance from the White House and EPA, will be sufficient to ensure prompt and complete PFAS remediation

Paying for Prison: Equal Protection Remedies for the United States\u27 Wealth Discrimination Problem

The American dream promises wealth, mobility, and security, yet daily millions of Americans live in abject poverty. What’s more, state and local policies render low-income people uniquely vulnerable to criminalization, further lessening their ability to attain this purported American dream. These effects are not incidental. Rather, they reflect a complexly interwoven system of wealth-based discrimination oftentimes promulgated and perpetuated by government actors. Yet, most constitutional anti-discrimination measures do not reach wealth-based discrimination despite the horrific everyday effects felt by low-income communities nationwide. The criminalization of poverty compounds these problems to create a never-ending cycle of discrimination and collateral consequences whose aftershocks are felt for generations to come. These problems beg solutions in the form of expanded constitutional protection for low-income people, namely, in holding government actors accountable for their anti-poor policies by creating a bright-line rule for wealth-based discrimination to be regarded at a higher level of scrutiny. Modern reality elucidates the extent to which the current body of relevant law is not only muddled, but out of touch with Americans’ every-day, and creates more questions than answers as to how to reconcile this ever-growing problem. As more and more low-income people face jail solely on account of their poverty by the day, recognizing their plight as one of discrimination highlights the systemic importance of this issue. Recognizing the criminalization of poverty as a constitutional problem rather than isolated within the criminal justice context commands the gravity of the courts that it deserves, while preserving remedies for low-income people whose rights are violated on the daily. This Note explores how the Supreme Court’s current Equal Protection jurisprudence inadequately addresses issues of wealth-based discrimination, particularly within the criminal justice system. The Note proposes a strict scrutiny framework towards wealth-based discrimination based on the complex social, political, economic, and legal forces that render low-income people disproportionately vulnerable to criminalization. Above all, this Note advocates for a reconsideration of how legal advocates address this complex sociopolitical issue as a means of radical lawyering and holding the government accountable for its discrimination against low-income people

Antisocial Innovation

Innovation is a form of civic religion in the United States. In the popular imagination, innovators are heroic figures. Thomas Edison, Steve Jobs, and (for a while) Elizabeth Holmes were lauded for their vision and drive and seen to embody the American spirit of invention and improvement. For their part, politicians rarely miss a chance to trumpet their vision for boosting innovative activity. Popular and political culture alike treat innovation as an unalloyed good. And the law is deeply committed to fostering innovation, spending billions of dollars a year to make sure society has enough of it. But this sunny vision of innovation as purely beneficial is mistaken. Some innovations, like the polio and Covid-19 vaccines, are unquestionably good for society. But many innovations are, on balance, neutral, and many more are simply bad for society (cigarette additives, worker surveillance, firearm bump stocks), or potentially catastrophic (artificial intelligence). Moreover, some neutral innovations transfer wealth from one group to another in ways that might be morally objectionable (pricing algorithms). This Article argues that a fuller conception of innovation’s costs and benefits counsels a reorientation of law and policy. It begins with a taxonomy of various kinds of antisocial innovation, cataloging and describing individual, environmental, competition, labor, privacy, and societal harms. Then, the Article presents a series of policy recommendations to begin addressing antisocial innovation’s risks. We also consider further opportunities for law to engage in ex ante regulation of some kinds of innovation, to prevent harms before they arise

Answering the Call from Victims of Dating Violence: Georgia’s New Dating Violence Law

Dating violence is a topic that has garnered increased awareness in recent days, both in the media and in the legal field. Many states have begun to pass legislation in attempt to address this issue and provide relief for victims of dating violence. In the summer of 2021, the state of Georgia passed House Bill 231, what later became known as Georgia’s Dating Violence law. This Article first examines our nation’s history of intimate partner violence to show why dating violence legislation was so desperately needed and how these legislative reforms have attempted to heal a system that for so long has excluded victims of dating relationships. Specifically, this Article examines the history of House Bill 231, which codified Georgia’s dating violence law, and why it took Georgia so much longer than other states to enact such a statute. You will hear from Georgia State Representative Houston Gaines, the author and strong proponent of this bill on how difficult it was to get the bill passed, despite the good that it set out to do for the state’s high rates of violence. Representative Gaines speaks to the culture of the General Assembly, as well as how and why the bill was written as a separate statute section. You will also hear from the Solicitor General of Bibb County, Rebecca Grist, on why she felt the law was needed and the process of working alongside the state legislature to create a bill that helped the largest number of people. This Article also emphasizes the similarities and differences between Georgia’s law and the laws of other states, specifically addressing the idea that Georgia codified dating violence as its own unique statute, unlike the majority of other states that just added a provision or section to their already codified domestic violence laws. Further, an argument is made about whether Georgia’s method of adding a new code section for dating violence has proven to be greater than its counterparts or whether it has unintended results. Lastly, this Article will look at the consequences of Georgia’s dating violence law since its enactment in July 2021. First, the law itself will be broken down to its bare bones, explaining each section and its intended effect. This Article delves deeper into the discussion of the temporary protective order section as one of the main objectives of this legislation is to allow victims of relationship violence to achieve relief from their aggressor through a temporary protective order accessible through their local courts. While there has not been a large amount of statistical data collected given such a short time frame since the legislation’s enactment, this Article includes a first-hand account from Superior Court Judge Wade Padgett of the Columbia Judicial Circuit on his experience working with this new law and seeing its results play out daily in his job. Judge Padgett teases out some of the benefits he has experienced since the law’s enactment as they relate to the rates of partner violence. He also mentions some of the law’s drawbacks and how it has resulted in numerous temporary protective orders being issued and dismissed a short while later. After examining the history of dating violence in this country, whether it be teen dating violence, or simply intimate partner violence, this Article will attempt to make an argument as to whether Georgia’s new dating violence statute has answered the desperate call from the many victims of relationship violence in the state, or if it has fallen short, and if so, some ways to alleviate the shortcomings of the law