Herbivore induction of the glucosinolate-myrosinase defense system: major trends, biochemical bases and ecological significance

Like many other plant defense compounds, glucosinolates are present constitutively in plant tissues, but are also induced to higher levels by herbivore attack. Of the major glucosinolate types, indolic glucosinolates are most frequently induced regardl

A Complete Generalized Adjustment Criterion

Covariate adjustment is a widely used approach to estimate total causal effects from observational data. Several graphical criteria have been developed in recent years to identify valid covariates for adjustment from graphical causal models. These criteria can handle multiple causes, latent confounding, or partial knowledge of the causal structure; however, their diversity is confusing and some of them are only sufficient, but not necessary. In this paper, we present a criterion that is necessary and sufficient for four different classes of graphical causal models: directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), maximum ancestral graphs (MAGs), completed partially directed acyclic graphs (CPDAGs), and partial ancestral graphs (PAGs). Our criterion subsumes the existing ones and in this way unifies adjustment set construction for a large set of graph classes.Comment: 10 pages, 6 figures, To appear in Proceedings of the 31st Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI2015

Complete Graphical Characterization and Construction of Adjustment Sets in Markov Equivalence Classes of Ancestral Graphs

We present a graphical criterion for covariate adjustment that is sound and complete for four different classes of causal graphical models: directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), maximum ancestral graphs (MAGs), completed partially directed acyclic graphs (CPDAGs), and partial ancestral graphs (PAGs). Our criterion unifies covariate adjustment for a large set of graph classes. Moreover, we define an explicit set that satisfies our criterion, if there is any set that satisfies our criterion. We also give efficient algorithms for constructing all sets that fulfill our criterion, implemented in the R package dagitty. Finally, we discuss the relationship between our criterion and other criteria for adjustment, and we provide new soundness and completeness proofs for the adjustment criterion for DAGs.Comment: 58 pages, 12 figures, to appear in JML

Brentano on Consciousness

Consider a perceptual activity such as seeing a colour, hearing a tone, tasting a flavour. How are these activities related to one’s awareness of them? I will use Brentano’s struggle with this question to guide the reader through the development of his view on consciousness. My starting point will be Brentano’s book Die Psychologie des Aristoteles (Brentano 1867), in which he developed an inner sense view of consciousness (§§1-2). Brentano’s early view is underexplored in the literature, but crucial for understanding the development of his thought on the matter. In his major work Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt (1874) he rejected the existence of an inner sense: the exercises of our five senses yield awareness of the world (or at least of intentional objects) as well as awareness of these perceptions. This same-level view of consciousness has been explored and developed by contemporary philosophers of mind. I will discuss the arguments that moved Brentano to change his mind, outline the view and, finally, respond to Husserl’s influential criticism of Brentano’s view (§§3-5)

Rigidity and De Jure Rigidity

Most discussions of Kripke's Naming and Necessity focus either on Kripke's so-called "historical theory of reference" or his thesis that names are rigid designators. But in response to problems of the rigidity thesis Kripke later points out that his thesis about proper names is a stronger one: proper names are de jure rigid. This sets the agenda for my paper. Certain problems raised for Kripke's view show that the notion of de jure rigidity is in need of clarification. I will try to clarify the notion of de jure rigidity by analyzing characterizations of it given in the literature. I will argue in particular that Kripke can count descriptive names as de jure rigid and that the concept of de jure rigidity should not be explained with recourse to the concept of a semantical rule. The second part of the paper is a critical discussion of arguments intended to show that proper names are not de jure rigid. I will show that these arguments are unconvincing by using Dummett's distinction between assertoric content and ingredient sense