Who acts more like a game theorist? Group and individual play in a sequential market game and the effect of the time horizon

Previous experimental results on one-shot sequential two-player games show that group de- cisions are closer to the subgame-perfect Nash equilbirum than individual decisions. We extend the analysis of inter-group versus inter-individual decision making to a Stackelberg market game, by running both one-shot and repeated markets. Whereas in the one-shot markets we ?nd no signi?cant di¤erences in the behavior of groups and individuals, we ?nd that the behavior of groups is further away from the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the stage game than that of individuals. To a large extent, this result is independent of the method of eliciting choices (sequential or strategy method) and the method used to account for observed ?rst- and second- mover behavior. We provide evidence on followers?response functions and electronic chats to o¤er an explanation for the di¤erential e¤ect that the time horizon of interaction has on the extent of individual and group players?(non)conformity with subgame perfectness.

Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game

This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third party independent of the implicated parties who propose the punishment. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we find an independent third party vetoes not only punishment to the cooperators but punishment to the defectors as well. Compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.Social dilemmas; third party; punishment; cooperation; experiment

Voting on Punishment Systems within a Heterogeneous Group

We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low productivity. Every two or eight periods, depending on the treatment, individuals vote on a punishment regime, in which certain individuals are permitted, but not required, to have punishment directed toward them. The punishment system can condition on type and contribution history. The results indicate that the most effective regime, in terms of contributions and earnings, is one that allows punishment of low contributors only, regardless of productivity. Nevertheless, only a minority of sessions converge to this system, indicating a tendency for the voting process to lead to suboptimal institutional choice.voting, punishment, voluntary contributions, heterogeneity, experiment

A Study of the Feasibility of Xu Yuanchong’s Theories of Literary Translation and of His Findings

By using the method of qualitative analysis including comparison and by analyzing some typical examples this paper discusses and proves Xu s principle of creative translation and that of excellence focusing on the feasibility of his three-beauty principle beauty in meaning in sound and in form The typical examples are analyzed in detail mainly from the perspective of prosody Besides by employing the deductive approach the paper explores and explains Xu s findings through his translation of classical literature In addition the paper emphasizes that the principle of creative translationand that of excellence and thethree-beauty criterion are closely associated withone another The former two help to ensure the implementation of the three-beauty standard Finally the paper states that they are all proved to be objective scientific practical and widely applicabl

Study on the Development of the Intermediate Business of Commercial Banks in China

China’s commercial banks have developed intermediate business for decades, but compared with western developed countries, they are still left far behind with many problems including limited types, small scale, low quality and lacking unified charging standards. The hidden causes behind these questions are the banks’ lack of attention to the intermediate business, lack of versatile talents, lack of innovation and lack of sound legal system. In order to solve the dilemma, all of the parties need to coordinate, the banks should pay enough attention to the intermediary business, colleges and universities should cultivate more complex and practical talents, the society should vigorously encourage innovation, supervision departments should establish a sound legal system and charge management system

Providing global public goods: Electoral delegation and cooperation

This paper experimentally examines the effect of electoral delegation on providing global public goods shared by several groups. Each group elects a delegate who can freely decide on each group member’s contribution (including the contribution of herself) to the global public good. Our results show that people mostly vote for delegates who assign equal contributions for every group member. However, in contrast to standard theoretical predictions, unequal contributions across groups drive cooperation down over time, and it decreases efficiency by almost 50% compared to the benchmark. This pattern is not driven by delegates trying to exploit their fellow group members, as indicated by the theory – quite to the opposite, other-regarding preferences and a re-election incentives guarantee that delegates assign equal contributions for all group members. Since the source of the resulting inefficiency is the polycentric nature of global public goods provision together with other-regarding preferences, we use the term Pinefficiency to describe our finding

Can transparency hurt? An experiment on whether disclosure of audit policy details reduces tax compliance

Tax authorities around the world often are reluctant to disclose audit policy details. In particular, the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has the practice of releasing broad statistics like the audit rate of each income class but resists pressures demanding details on how different circumstances might result in a higher audit probability to taxpayers. This paper experimentally examines whether disclosing such details can reduce tax compliance. We compare a Flat-rate treatment, where taxpayers are told about the average audit probability, with a Bounded treatment, where taxpayers are fully informed of the contingent audit probability structure. Our findings do not support the potential concern against disclosing details. In an additional Bounded-hi-q treatment where multiple equilibria exist, the compliance level is even higher under full disclosure of the probability structure

Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game

This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third party independent of the implicated parties who propose the punishment. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we find an independent third party vetoes not only punishment to the cooperators but punishment to the defectors as well. Compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party

Justification and Legitimate Punishment

Punishment can lose its legitimacy if the enforcer can profit from delivering punishment. We use a controlled laboratory experiment to examine how justification can combat profit-seeking punishment and promote the legitimacy of punishment. In a one-shot sender-receiver game, an independent third party can punish the sender upon seeing whether the sender has told the truth. Most third parties punish the senders regardless of how the senders behave when they can profit from punishment. However, majority third parties punish the sender if and only if the sender lies when they have to provide explanations for their punishment decisions. Our data also suggests that senders are more likely to perceive punishment as legitimate and behave honestly when they know the enforcer has to justify their punishment decisions. Our findings suggest that justification requirement plays an important role in building efficient punishment institutions