Speed accuracy tradeoff? Not so fast: Marginal changes in speed have inconsistent relationships with accuracy in real-world settings

The speed-accuracy tradeoff suggests that responses generated under time constraints will be less accurate. While it has undergone extensive experimental verification, it is less clear whether it applies in settings where time pressures are not being experimentally manipulated (but where respondents still vary in their utilization of time). Using a large corpus of 29 response time datasets containing data from cognitive tasks without experimental manipulation of time pressure, we probe whether the speed-accuracy tradeoff holds across a variety of tasks using idiosyncratic within-person variation in speed. We find inconsistent relationships between marginal increases in time spent responding and accuracy; in many cases, marginal increases in time do not predict increases in accuracy. However, we do observe time pressures (in the form of time limits) to consistently reduce accuracy and for rapid responses to typically show the anticipated relationship (i.e., they are more accurate if they are slower). We also consider analysis of items and individuals. We find substantial variation in the item-level associations between speed and accuracy. On the person side, respondents who exhibit more within-person variation in response speed are typically of lower ability. Finally, we consider the predictive power of a person's response time in predicting out-of-sample responses; it is generally a weak predictor. Collectively, our findings suggest the speed-accuracy tradeoff may be limited as a conceptual model in its application in non-experimental settings and, more generally, offer empirical results and an analytic approach that will be useful as more response time data is collected

Clarifying the Virtue Profile of the Good Thinker: An Interdisciplinary Approach

What does it mean to be a good thinker? Which virtues work together in someone who possesses good intellectual character? Although recent research on virtues has highlighted the benefits of individual intellectual virtues, being an excellent thinker is likely a function of possessing multiple intellectual virtues. Specifically, a good thinker would both recognize one’s intellectual shortcomings and possess an eagerness to learn driven by virtues such as love of knowledge, curiosity, and open-mindedness. Good intellectual character may only successfully manifest when individuals possess not just one or a few intellectual virtues, but a larger set of such virtues to different degrees. However, little is currently known about what combination of virtues are necessary for good thinking. We argue that it is important to identify and clarify the nature of the good thinker and outline a profile methodology for achieving this goal. This approach characterizes the good thinker in terms of a profile of multiple intellectual virtues. Understanding this profile can allow greater insight into the extent to which people possess such a profile, and the potential for societal benefits of educating for these qualities

Speed–Accuracy Trade-Off? Not So Fast: Marginal Changes in Speed Have Inconsistent Relationships With Accuracy in Real-World Settings

The speed–accuracy trade-off (SAT) suggests that time constraints reduce response accuracy. Its relevance in observational settings—where response time (RT) may not be constrained but respondent speed may still vary—is unclear. Using 29 data sets containing data from cognitive tasks, we use a flexible method for identification of the SAT (which we test in extensive simulation studies) to probe whether the SAT holds. We find inconsistent relationships between time and accuracy; marginal increases in time use for an individual do not necessarily predict increases in accuracy. Additionally, the speed–accuracy relationship may depend on the underlying difficulty of the interaction. We also consider the analysis of items and individuals; of particular interest is the observation that respondents who exhibit more within-person variation in response speed are typically of lower ability. We further find that RT is typically a weak predictor of response accuracy. Our findings document a range of empirical phenomena that should inform future modeling of RTs collected in observational settings

Speed–Accuracy Trade-Off? Not So Fast: Marginal Changes in Speed Have Inconsistent Relationships With Accuracy in Real-World Settings

The speed–accuracy trade-off (SAT) suggests that time constraints reduce response accuracy. Its relevance in observational settings—where response time (RT) may not be constrained but respondent speed may still vary—is unclear. Using 29 data sets containing data from cognitive tasks, we use a flexible method for identification of the SAT (which we test in extensive simulation studies) to probe whether the SAT holds. We find inconsistent relationships between time and accuracy; marginal increases in time use for an individual do not necessarily predict increases in accuracy. Additionally, the speed–accuracy relationship may depend on the underlying difficulty of the interaction. We also consider the analysis of items and individuals; of particular interest is the observation that respondents who exhibit more within-person variation in response speed are typically of lower ability. We further find that RT is typically a weak predictor of response accuracy. Our findings document a range of empirical phenomena that should inform future modeling of RTs collected in observational settings