Merging second-person and first-person neuroscience

Schilbach et al. contrast second-person and third-person approaches to social neuroscience. We discuss relations between second-person and first-person approaches, arguing that they cannot be studied in isolation. Contingency is central for converging first- and second-person approaches. Studies of embodiment show how contingencies scaffold first-person perspective and how the transition from a third- to a second-person perspective fundamentally involves first-person contributions

From the Fact to the Sense of Agency

This chapter reviews the empirical literature and contrast explicit and implicit tasks investigating the experience of agency with the aim of identifying the functional and neural signatures of the sense of agency. From the design of nonecological situations where there is ambiguity over the authorship of an action to the implementation of control conditions of passive movements that make little sense in our everyday waking life, the reviewed studies have tried to identify the key elements of what constitutes the sense of agency in humans. The exact interplay between conscious intentions and behavior, and the balance between predictive and postdictive processes remain controversial. However, the empirical investigation of the fact of agency, that is, the study of situations where people unambiguously produce voluntary actions, suggests that self-generated behavior changes the perception of one’s body and the external world by integrating temporal and spatial representations of movements and their effects on the world

Being a beast machine: the somatic basis of selfhood

Modern psychology has long focused on the body as the basis of the self. Recently, predictive processing accounts of interoception (perception of the body ‘from within’) have become influential in accounting for experiences of body ownership and emotion. Here, we describe embodied selfhood in terms of ‘instrumental interoceptive inference’, which emphasises allostatic regulation and physiological integrity. We apply this approach to the distinctive phenomenology of embodied selfhood, accounting for its non-object-like character and subjective stability over time. Our perspective has implications for the development of selfhood, and illuminates longstanding debates about relations between life and mind, implying – contrary to Descartes – that experiences of embodied selfhood arise because of, and not in spite of, our nature as ‘beast machines’

Balancing the "inner" and the "outer" self:interoceptive sensitivity modulates self-other boundaries

Distinguishing self from other is necessary for self-awareness and social interactions. This distinction is thought to depend on multisensory integration dominated by visual feedback. However, self-awareness also relies on the processing of interoceptive signals. We contrasted the exteroceptive and interoceptive models of the self to investigate the hitherto unexplored interaction between the perception of the self from the outside and from within. Multisensory stimulation between self and other was used to induce controlled changes in the representation of one’s identity. Interoceptive sensitivity predicted the malleability of self-representations in response to multisensory integration across behavioral, physiological and introspective responses, suggesting that interoception plays a key modulating role in the self-recognition system. In particular, only participants with low interoceptive sensitivity experienced changes in self-other boundaries in response to multisensory stimulation. These results support the view that interoceptive predictive coding models are used to monitor and assign the sources of sensory input either to the self or to others, as well as support the hypothesis of the insular cortex as a convergence zone in the processing and global representation of the material self given its involvement in both interoceptive feelings, multisensory integration and self-processing

Heartfelt empathy? No association between interoceptive awareness, questionnaire measures of empathy, reading the mind in the eyes task or the director task

Interoception, defined as afferent information arising from within the body, is the basis of all emotional experience and underpins the ‘self’. However, people vary in the extent to which interoceptive signals reach awareness. This trait modulates both their experience of emotion and their ability to distinguish ‘self’ from ‘other’ in multisensory contexts. The experience of emotion and the degree of self/other distinction or overlap are similarly fundamental to empathy, which is an umbrella term comprising affect sharing, empathic concern and perspective-taking. A link has therefore often been assumed between interoceptive awareness and empathy despite a lack of clear evidence. To test the hypothesis that individual differences in both traits should correlate, we measured interoceptive awareness in four experiments, using a well-validated heartbeat perception task, and compared this with scores on several tests that relate to various aspects of empathy. We firstly measured scores on the Index of Interpersonal Reactivity and secondly on the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy. Thirdly, because the ‘simulationist’ account assumes that affect sharing is involved in recognising emotion, we employed the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task’ for the recognition of facial expressions. Contrary to expectation, we found no significant relationships between interoceptive awareness and any aspect of these measures. This striking lack of direct links has important consequences for hypotheses about the extent to which empathy is necessarily embodied. Finally, to assess cognitive perspective-taking ability, which specifically requires self/other distinction, we used the ‘Director Task’ but found no relationship. We conclude that the abilities that make up empathy are potentially related to interoceptive awareness in a variety of conflicting ways, such that a direct association between interoceptive awareness and various components of empathy has yet to be established

Being watched:The effect of social self-focus on interoceptive and exteroceptive somatosensory perception

We become aware of our bodies interoceptively, by processing signals arising from within the body, and exteroceptively, by processing signals arising on or outside the body. Recent research highlights the importance of the interaction of exteroceptive and interoceptive signals in modulating bodily self-consciousness. The current study investigated the effect of social self-focus, manipulated via a video camera that was facing the participants and that was either switched on or off, on interoceptive sensitivity (using a heartbeat perception task) and on tactile perception (using the Somatic Signal Detection Task (SSDT)). The results indicated a significant effect of self-focus on SSDT performance, but not on interoception. SSDT performance was not moderated by interoceptive sensitivity, although interoceptive sensitivity scores were positively correlated with false alarms, independently of self-focus. Together with previous research, our results suggest that self-focus may exert different effects on body perception depending on its mode (private versus social). While interoception has been previously shown to be enhanced by private self-focus, the current study failed to find an effect of social self-focus on interoceptive sensitivity, instead demonstrating that social self-focus improves exteroceptive somatosensory processing