Gaul, conversation and youth genre(s) in Java

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Effects of no-tillage and subsoil loosening on soil physical properties and crop performance : a thesis presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Applied Science in Soil Science at Massey University

Much of New Zealand's lowland agriculture integrates animal and crop production on poorly drained, easily compacted soils. Over the years, conventional cultivation has given rise to degraded soil structure on many farms. No-tillage has been shown to avoid many of these problems but the question remains: "Where soils are compact, what combination of deep tillage and/or drainage systems and no-tillage allow for the most efficient transition from conventional cultivation to no-tillage crop establishment?" The objective of this study was to ascertain if soil properties, and crop (Brassica campestis x Brassica napus cv "Pasja" followed by wheat Triticum aestivum cv "Kohika") establishment and yield on land converted from a conventionally tilled system to a no-tillage system could be improved by various subsoiling and mole plough operations. Plots on a Milson silt loam (Argillic Perch-Gley Pallic Soil) (Typic Ochraqualf) were paraplowed (PP), straight-legged subsoiled (SL), mole ploughed (M) or were left as non-subsoiled controls (C) in the autumn of 1997. Forage brassica was then sown with a Cross-Slot™ no-tillage drill. Wheat was established on the same plots with the same no-tillage drill in the spring of 1997. Subsoiling initially reduced soil strength by a significant amount. Shortly after subsoiling cone indices showed disruption to 300 mm with PP, 350 mm with SL and 100 mm with M. At the same time, approximately 20% of profile cone indices from subsoiled treatments were greater than 2 MPa, compared to approximately 52% for C and M. At 267 days after subsoiling, PP continued to have lower cone index values than C and M. Subsoiling initially reduced bulk density. When measured in May, the bulk density of PP plots was significantly lower than SL, M and C although reconsolidation in all plots was observed in February 1998 after the wheat was harvested. Air permeability in PP, SL and M was significantly greater than in C. Despite the differences in soil strength and bulk density (but not air permeability), subsoiling and mole ploughing did not produce differences in plant populations or yield for either the winter brassica or spring-sown wheat crops. The lack of any differences for brassica crop performance criteria were in spite of the vertical rooting depth being greater in the PP treatment. The lack of differences in plant establishment and yield was thought to be due to the relatively dry autumn and winter soil conditions and the use of the Cross-Slot™ no-tillage opener which is reported to be tolerant of variable soil conditions

Insuring Against a Derivative Disaster: The Case for Decentralized Risk Management

This Article makes the case for a decentralized risk management strategy for identifying and defusing future bubble markets. It suggests how the government can enlist private gatekeeper guarantors to provide integrated insurance and monitoring roles to complement the government’s management of systemic risks. It proposes the enactment of a federal mandate that systemically significant financial entities (or participants in systemically significant financial sectors) secure private guarantees to cover a percentage of their potential liabilities (above a loss threshold). Gatekeeper guarantors would act as “circuit breakers” of systemic risk by serving as self-interested monitors of risk taking and tying clients’ coverage to ongoing constraints on risk taking. Gatekeeper guarantors would serve as “bailout buffers” by providing financial backing in the event of defaults and thereby mitigating the government’s potential liability exposure. This expansive role would come with government oversight to ensure that gatekeeper guarantors satisfy reserve requirements, so that they can credibly serve as sea walls in the face of future financial tsunamis. This Article will illustrate the potential for decentralized risk management by showing how a mandate for private reinsurance (or its functional equivalent) may reduce systemic risks in the over-the-counter derivatives market. Reinsurers would bear a percentage of derivative participants’ liability, which would incentivize reinsurers to charge premiums reflecting their risk assessments and to monitor and condition clients’ liability exposure. The repeat-player status of reinsurers would position them to force derivatives’ participants to change their risk exposure as market conditions unfold. Reinsurers would have leverage to push insured parties to demand disclosures from counter-parties, thereby heightening transparency and reducing risks for their clients and the market as a whole. Government monitoring could build on existing state oversight of reinsurers, but provide teeth with expanded reserve requirements to ensure reinsurers are equipped to handle this role

Economic Liberty Takings

State governors rediscovered the sweeping contours of their police powers in imposing recurring waves of COVID-19 pandemic shutdowns. However necessary shutdowns have been to slow down the spread of COVID-19, state governors’ actions have exposed how takings law has become all but toothless in compensating business owners from state-imposed shutdowns. The result has been state governors picking economic winners and losers. Stores and sectors that state governors designated as “essential” have remained continuously open and received windfalls of pandemic profits. In contrast, businesses that state governors deemed “non-essential” have been stripped of their ability to function for months at a time or faced debilitating restrictions.Both federal and state constitutions enshrine protection from takings without just compensation as a foundational principle for property rights. But courts have narrowed temporary, regulatory takings doctrines over time to make takings protections all but meaningless in the face of unprecedented economic disruptions from state action. This approach has left business owners without any effective legal recourse and forced them to wait for handouts from the federal government to mitigate the impact of state shutdowns.This Article proposes creating economic liberty takings to institutionalize the compensation of business owners from temporary shutdowns or substantially similar regulatory burdens that strip businesses of profitability. The case for reviving temporary, regulatory takings is that states and localities should be forced to internalize the costs of decisions that strip business owners of their ability to function. The logic is not to make shutdowns economically infeasible for state budgets, but rather to incentivize state governors and legislatures to strike a better balance between protecting public health and respecting the economic liberty of business owners. Governors dealing future crises would have incentives to give businesses scope to function in economically sustainable ways to sidestep potential takings compensation.This Article first makes the limited case for positioning economic liberty takings within the existing landscape of temporary, regulatory takings doctrines. Then it shows how courts can modify the seminal Penn Central test for regulatory takings, the Tahoe- Sierra approach to temporary takings, and the Lucas lens for categorical takings to establish economic-liberty-takings protections for businesses. Lastly, the Article makes the case for a complementary, statutory approach that can implement a sliding scale of compensation for regulatory burdens that do not rise to the level of a temporary, regulatory taking. These proposals restore greater balance between the exercise of state police powers and the investment-backed expectations of businesses, while preserving incentives of affected businesses to work within temporary, regulatory constraints to maintain their profitability.This Article then offers a balanced approach to compensating businesses for economic liberty takings by focusing on declines in net profits. Courts have traditionally struggled to translate the logic of real property-based physical-takings compensation to the temporary, regulatory takings business context. The concern is that using business losses or revenue declines as metrics for takings compensation may fuel moral hazard, as these numbers are hard to verify and easy to inflate. The solution is to offset the expansion of economic liberty takings eligibility with a limited compensation focus on businesses’ declines in net profits. Every company must disclose net profits for federal and state taxation, which means that their previous years of net profits would be easy to verify. Using the previous year’s net profits (or a multi-year average) as a baseline for potential takings compensation would facilitate ease of administration, reward the honesty of companies in complying with tax law, and serve as a cap on damages. This approach would also incentivize businesses to mitigate damages, as the limited scope of profit-based compensation would induce businesses to proactively take cost-savings measures in the face of potential takings