Sell Unipolarity? The Future of an Overvalued Concept

For at least the past thirty years, scholarship on international relations has been bewitched by a simple proposition: the polarity of the international system is a central cause of great power strategies and politics. The number of poles (dominant countries) in the system is like an invisible fence that shapes states as if they were dogs with electronic collars or a Skinner box that conditions national rats. States can choose to ignore the fence or box, but if they do, they must pay the consequences. The polarity of the international system as defined by the number of great powers - involving more than two (multipolarity), two (bipolarity), or one (unipolarity) - is expected to mold states and international politics in different predictable ways. The central place of polarity in IR theory is such that it is commonly assumed that the appropriate way to study the world is to examine the impact of polarity first and then move on to other lesser factors to mop up any unexplained variance

Purpose Transitions: China and the American Response

We know that China is rising, but what will China do with that power? Distracted by power trends, both American policymakers and political scientists have not paid enough attention to purpose--what states intend to do with their power. Power is critical in international relations, but it is not destiny. The dominant lens for understanding the rise of China has been power transition theory, which insightfully probes the effects of power trajectories between rising and falling countries (e.g., the expected future of China and the United States). Yet what we also need to understand is purpose transition --that is, when and why the core intentions of countries in international politics change. This is a critical question because China today is mostly a cooperative participant in the existing international order. Will it remain so? And what can the United States do to shape that trajectory

The Ties that Bind the United States: A Recount (Book Review)

Review of the book, World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy by Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlworth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008

Bilateralism

Bilateralism concerns relations or policies of joint action between two parties. It can be contrasted with unilateralism (where one party acts on its own) and multilateralism (where three or more parties are involved). Typically, the term has applications concerning political, economic, and security matters between two states. Bilateralism has both costs and benefits, and there is a debate on its merits relative to unilateral or multilateral approaches

Military Culture and Inadvertent Escalation in World War II

How can the use of unthinkable means of warfare be avoided? How can states successfully observe mutually desired limitations on taboo forms of combat? These questions are important because of concern that nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and terrorism will spread and be used. The growing number of states--e.g., Israel, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Ukraine--that have such means of inflicting harm increases the likelihood that any future conflict will involve a desire for restrictions. Countries may pursue restraint because popular opinion vilifies certain weapons; because leaders calculate that escalation would damage their domestic and international political support; or because states fear retaliatory attacks. Unfortunately, even when nations agree that limitations are desirable, restraint does not always endure. A key source of this disparity can be found in accidents and inadvertent escalation. In contemporary affairs among major powers, the apparent absence of grounds for intentional aggression, against a backdrop of change and instability, makes the unintended expansion of conflict a central concern. States may not seek a spiral of hostility but still can stumble into escalation. Why

Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order

Stunning shifts in the worldviews of states mark the modern history of international affairs: how do societies think about—and rethink—international order and security? Japan\u27s opening, German conquest, American internationalism, Maoist independence, and Gorbachev\u27s new thinking molded international conflict and cooperation in their eras. How do we explain such momentous changes in foreign policy—and in other cases their equally surprising absence? The nature of strategic ideas, Jeffrey W. Legro argues, played a critical and overlooked role in these transformations. Big changes in foreign policies are rare because it is difficult for individuals to overcome the inertia of entrenched national mentalities. Doing so depends on a particular nexus of policy expectations, national experience, and ready replacement ideas. In a sweeping comparative history, Legro explores the sources of strategy in the United States and Germany before and after the world wars, in Tokugawa Japan, and in the Soviet Union. He charts the likely future of American primacy and a rising China in the coming century. Rethinking the World tells us when and why we can expect changes in the way states think about the world, why some ideas win out over others, and why some leaders succeed while others fail in redirecting grand strategy.https://scholarship.richmond.edu/bookshelf/1265/thumbnail.jp

Soviet crisis decision‐making and the Gorbachev reforms

The Soviet Union led by President Mikhail Gorbachev has widely heralded the adoption of a new military doctrine which posits war prevention as its fundamental goal. Yet, as Akhromeyev acknowledges in the above quote, a reliable defence, or preparation for war, is also essential. What is not acknowledged, let alone resolved, is that the two desired goals - prevention and preparation - may come into sharp conflict, especially in a super-power crisis. Prevention of war may make it necessary to defer actions which ready forces for battle or reduce their vulnerability. If war appears likely, however, pressures will arise to initiate military preparations, if not operations. Yet if one side prepares, a spiral may start which could end in an otherwise avoidable conflict or even a nuclear exchange. How will the USSR manage this dilemma

Trip Report: Admiral Crowe\u27s Visit to the Soviet Union, March 17-25, 1990

I recently accompanied Admiral William Crowe, retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his 9-day stay in the USSR. The trip was an extension of the U.S.-USSR military-to-military exchanges that were initiated under Crowe\u27s leadership at the JCS. The purposes of the trip were to reciprocate Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev\u27s visit to the United States and to testify to the Supreme Soviet\u27s Committee on Defense and State Security. In addition to the Admiral, the delegation included his wife, his longtime aide, Captain Jay Coupe, Steve Sestanovich of CSIS, Kurt Campbell of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Harvard\u27s JFK School, and myself