Thesis (Ph.D.) University of Alaska Fairbanks, 2016Increasing seasonal ice free Arctic waters and market demand to expand hydrocarbon extraction to previously undeveloped offshore regions has accelerated an Arctic priority in national strategies and international forums. It is proposed that geo-strategically, the sheer size of the Kara Sea hydrocarbon fields is of a predictive magnitude great enough to impact the progression or regression of the Russian economy; and thereby have a predictive value on the capacity for Russian unilateral foreign policy decisions. Rosneft has released figures of a potential 30 to 40 billion barrels of recoverable undiscovered oil reserves in the South Kara Sea basin and significantly more in the more remote northern waters, representing the largest unexploited hydrocarbon potential remaining for the Russian Federation. There are also undercurrents of skepticism that the Russians may not achieve offshore production at the pace and or scale they envision. Though the direct economic contributions to the global economy of exploitation of Kara Sea hydrocarbons is likely not a game changer, the technological sophistication it will require and the level of cooperation and integration needed between the most advanced Western corporate techniques and Russian partners, could well be for Russian central state stability. In this context, hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea region lends itself to interdisciplinary study as a means to assess Russia's relative strategic stability. The research incorporated two primary tools to assess the drivers impacting successful Russian hydrocarbon development of its Kara Sea resources. The first was a survey-interview of experts and the second was the creation of scenario narratives (assisted by a workshop of Arctic experts and stakeholders). The four scenarios were designed to explore the complexity of the interplay of the drivers of hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea, with the objective, of identifying plausible future decision points for planners and policy makers.7.2.2 Kara Industrial Security Region (KISR)Chapter 1 Introduction -- 1.0 Current context of hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea -- 1.1 Significance of the study -- 1.2 Statement of the problem and purpose -- 1.3 Research questions -- 1.4 Tools, methods and research structure -- 1.5 Limitations, delimitations, assumptions and worldview -- Chapter 2 General context -- 2.0 Overview -- 2.1 Centrality of hydrocarbons to Russian strategic stability -- 2.1.1 Russian dependency on extractive export earnings -- 2.1.2 Russia's Arctic strategy and energy production -- 2.1.3 The Kara Sea: strategic maritime region for the Russian Federation -- 2.2 Context of Kara Sea hydrocarbons -- 2.2.1 Specifics of Kara Sea Rosneft-ExxonMobil JV -- 2.2.2 Major projects in the Kara Sea region and their inter-relationship -- 2.2.3 Timelines and their impact: exploration to production -- 2.2.4 The Northern Sea Route -- 2.2.5 Yamal and the Sabetta Port Project -- 2.2.6 Maritime character of the Kara Sea -- 2.2.6.1 Impact of climate change -- 2.2.7 Regional social impacts on hydrocarbon development -- 2.2.8 Character of governance -- 2.2.9 Environmental standards in Russia -- Chapter 3 Global influences on Russian hydrocarbon development -- 3.0 Overview -- 3.1 Russia and the oil and gas industry -- 3.1.1 Historical precedent: the fall of the Soviet Union -- 3.1.2 Confusion, privatization and reassertion of control -- 3.1.3 Energy as a geopolitical weapon? -- 3.2 Current and future global demand -- 3.2.1 Price of hydrocarbons and relation to demand -- 3.2.2 Difference in oil and gas markets -- 3.2.2.1 Impact of non-traditional recovery -- 3.2.3 Transportation costs -- 3.2.4 Regulatory environment for IOCs in Russia -- 3.2.5 Corporate social responsibility -- 3.2.5.1. If disaster strikes -- 3.3 Arctic strategies -- 3.3.1 Russian Arctic strategy: cooperative security or strategic zero sum game? -- 3.3.1.1 Russian strategy and international cooperation -- 3.3.1.1.1 Russian cooperation in the Arctic -- 3.3.1.2 Russian concepts of security in their Arctic strategy -- 3.3.2 US Arctic strategy -- 3.3.3 Norwegian Arctic strategy -- 3.3.3.1 Effectiveness and limits to region building -- 3.4 Sanctions and direct policy action -- Chapter 4 Methods, tools and research component -- 4.0 Overview -- 4.1 Qualitative methods -- 4.2 Complexity -- 4.3 Scenarios method -- 4.3.1 Origin of the scenario method -- 4.3.2 Quantitative and mixed method scenarios -- 4.4 Other tools used: survey-interviews and workshops -- 4.4.1 Survey-interview -- 4.4.2 Workshop -- Chapter 5 Expert survey-interview project -- 5.0 Overview -- 5.1 Survey-interview method and design -- 5.2 Survey-interview results -- 5.2.1 Self-characterization by participants -- 5.2.1.1 Highlights of self-identified expertise -- 5.2.2 Substantive questions -- 5.2.2.1 Tabulated results and (substantive questions 5-15) -- 5.3 Consolidated observations - key findings -- 5.4 Conclusions from survey-interview -- Chapter 6 Circumpolar offshore Arctic hydrocarbon scenario development -- 6.1 Scenario workshop -- 6.2 Workshop results -- 6.3 Workshop conclusion and refinement of drivers -- 6.3.1 Wildcards -- 6.3.2 Framing and defining linear endpoints -- 6.3.3 Matrix development: assessing the critical uncertainties -- 6.3.4 Framing of narrative quadrants -- Chapter 7 Scenario narratives -- 7.1 Scenarios: alternative futures for hydrocarbon development in the Kara Sea -- 7.2 Future for Kara Sea offshore hydrocarbon extraction -- 7.2.1 Western Arctic Maritime Union (WAMU) -- 7.2.3 Special Export Zone Kara (SEZK) -- 7.2.4 Arctic Shelf Ecological Park (ASEP) -- 7.3 Findings of narrative exercise -- Chapter 8 Conclusions -- 8.0 Overview -- 8.1 Outcomes -- 8.1.1 The global crude oil market is a highly significant driver -- 8.1.2 Impact of punitive sanctions -- 8.1.3 Will IOCs return? Are they necessary for Russian strategic objectives? -- 8.1.4 Significance of Kara Sea success on Russia's capacity as a state -- 8.1.5 Circumpolar impacts: environmental sound development? -- 8.1.6 Arctic and strategic policy implications -- 8.2 Final assessment -- References -- Appendices